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Major Academic Unit: Department of Risk Management and Insurance
This is a multi–essay dissertation in the area of mortality risk management. The first es-
say investigates natural hedging between life insurance and annuities and then proposes a
mortality swap between a life insurer and an annuity insurer. Compared with reinsurance,
capital markets have a greater capacity to absorb insurance shocks, and they may offer more
flexibility to meet insurers’ needs. Therefore, my second essay studies securitization of mor-
tality risks in life annuities. Specifically I design a mortality bond to transfer longevity risks
inherent in annuities or pension plans to financial markets. By explicitly taking into ac-
count the jumps in mortality stochastic processes, my third essay fills a gap in the mortality
securitization modeling literature by pricing mortality securities in an incomplete market
framework. Using the Survey of Consumer Finances, my fourth essay creates a new finan-
cial vulnerability index to examine a household’s life cycle demand for different types of life
insurance.
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Introduction and Overview
Mortality risk management is the process of identifying mortality risk exposures faced by
an insurance company, a pension plan or an individual and selecting the most appropriate
techniques for treating them (Rejda, 2005). Mortality risk management is critical to the
financial stability of an insurance company, a pension plan or a household. My dissertation
is a four–essay dissertation. It proposes new techniques for insurers and pension plans to
manage mortality risk and examines households’ life insurance demand.
Froot and Stein (1998) develop a framework for analyzing the capital allocation and
capital structure decisions facing financial institutions. Their model suggests that the hurdle
rate of an investment opportunity consists of two parts: the standard market-risk factor and
a factor for unhedgeable risk. Until now, little attention has been paid to the risk premium of
unhedgeable mortality risks. In the first essay, I find evidence that annuity writing insurers
who naturally hedge their annuity risk by also writing life insurance are able to charge lower
premiums than do otherwise similar insurers. The evidence suggests that insurers who utilize
natural hedging, a form of business diversification, have a competitive advantage.
1
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In the second part of my first essay I note that, in reality, the mix of an insurer’s life and
annuity businesses is not likely to provide an optimal hedge because of technical difficulties.
Moreover, the insurer may prefer business focus rather than diversification, as expanding
the number of activities of the firm is not without costs (Denis et al., 1997; Comment and
Jarrell, 1995; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lamont and Polk, 2002; Servaes, 1996; Scharfstein and
Stein, 2000). Thus, I design a set of securities that I call mortality swaps and demonstrate
that insurers can use the swaps to achieve the benefit of natural hedging without actually
“diversifying” the business of the insurers.
An important recent innovation in financial markets is the securitization of mortality
risks for catastrophic events such as natural disasters or exceptional improvements in life ex-
pectancy. Mortality securitization has the potential to enhance the capacity of the insurance
industry and allow it to efficiently spread risks beyond life insurance markets. Moreover,
it provides an additional way to diversify an investor’s portfolio as mortality risk may be
uncorrelated to or have low correlation with any other financial risk that underlies stock or
bond price movements. The purpose of my second essay is to explain the rationale for the
existence of mortality-based securities and to develop an equilibrium model that can be used
to price the proposed mortality securities. I focus on individual annuity data, although the
modeling techniques could be applied to other lines of annuity or life insurance.
The securitization of mortality risks is gaining more attention from investors. The first
two publicly known mortality securities are the Swiss Re mortality bond and the European
Investment Bank (EIB) longevity bond. Morgan Stanley reports that investors’ appetite for
the Swiss Re bonds was strong while, on the other hand, the EIB bond has not sold well.
The purpose of my third essay is to explain the interesting yet opposite market outcomes
for these two securities.
I begin by developing a mortality stochastic model that allows for jump risk. I then
consider the problem of pricing contingent claims on mortality bonds in an incomplete market
framework. My results suggest that the Swiss Re bonds compensated investors with a risk
premium that was approximately 90 percent higher than our model. On the other hand,
the model suggests the EIB bonds charged UK pension plans a higher risk premium than
did the insurance market for a similar level of longevity risk. Thus, the model explains why
investors had a strong appetite for the Swiss Re bonds and not the EIB bonds. The research
should also enable investors of future mortality bonds to understand better the uncertainty
and pricing associated with catastrophic mortality risk securities.
Using the Survey of Consumer Finances my fourth essay examines a life cycle demand
model for different types of life insurance. Specifically, I test for consumers’ avoidance of
income volatility as a result of the death of a wage-earning household member through the
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purchases of life insurance. The primary innovation in this research is that I develop a
financial vulnerability index to control for the risk to a household and show, in contrast to
previous research that there is a positive relationship between financial vulnerability and the
amount of term life or total life insurance purchases. In addition, I find older consumers
use less life insurance to protect a certain level of financial vulnerability than do younger
consumers. My results are robust no matter whether or not I take into account non-monetary
contribution of family members by imputing their housework value.
In summary, my dissertation examines mortality risk management for insurers, pension
plans and individuals. My first essay investigates natural hedging and proposes and prices a
mortality swap between a life insurer and an annuity insurer. My proposed mortality swaps
may help stabilize the cash outflows of life insurers and annuity insurers. Compared with
insurance markets, financial markets have much greater capacity to absorb catastrophe risks.
My second essay suggests that life insurer may transfer mortality risks to capital markets via
a mortality bond to increase their underwriting capacity. If so, life insurers are able to share
the “bigger cake” of annuity markets if the U.S. reforms its social security system. Mortality
securitization modeling is still an open question in the asset pricing literature. My third essay
proposes a model to price mortality securities in an incomplete market framework with jump
processes. This model nicely explains the opposite market outcomes of the first two mortality
bonds. Similar to insurance companies, households also need to manage their mortality risks
that arise from the death of wage-earning members. My fourth essay proposes a new financial
vulnerability index to explore whether there is a life cycle relation between a household’s
financial vulnerability and its life insurance holdings. The Overall, my dissertation will fill
several gaps in the literature on mortality risk management.
2
Natural Hedging of Life and Annuity
Mortality Risks
The values of life insurance and annuity liabilities move in opposite directions in response
to a change in the underlying mortality. Natural hedging utilizes this to stabilize aggregate
liability cash flows. I find empirical evidence that suggests that annuity writing insurers
that use natural hedging also charge lower premiums than otherwise similar insurers. This
indicates that insurers that are able to utilize natural hedging have a competitive advantage.
In addition, I show how a mortality swap might be used to provide the benefits of natural
hedging.
2.1 Introduction
If future mortality improves relative to current expectations, life insurer liabilities decrease
because death benefit payments will be later than expected. However, annuity writers have
a loss relative to current expectations because they have to pay annuity benefits longer
than expected. If mortality experience deteriorates, the situation is reversed: life insurers
have losses and annuity writers have gains. Natural hedging utilizes this interaction of life
insurance and annuities to a change in mortality to hedge against unexpected changes in
4
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future benefit payments.
The purpose of this paper is to study natural hedging of mortality risks and to propose
mortality swaps as a risk management tool. Few researchers investigate the issue of natural
hedging. Most of the prior research explores the impact of mortality changes on life insurance
and annuities separately, or investigates a simple combination of life and pure endowment
life contracts (Frees et al., 1996; Marceau and Gaillardetz, 1999; Milevsky and Promislow,
2001; Cairns et al., 2006). Studies on the impact of mortality changes on life insurance focus
on “bad” shocks while those on annuities focus on “good” shocks.
Wang et al. (2003) analyze the impact of the changes of mortality factors and propose an
immunization model to hedge risks based on mortality experience in Taiwan. Life insurance
and annuity mortality experience can be very different, so there is “basis risk” involved in
using annuities to hedge life insurance mortality risk. Their model cannot pick up this basis
risk.
Marceau and Gaillardetz (1999) examine the calculation of the reserves in a stochastic
mortality and interest rates environment for a general portfolio of life insurance policies.
In their numerical examples, they use portfolios of term life insurance contracts and pure
endowment polices, like Milevsky and Promislow (2001). They focus on convergence of
simulation results. There is a hedging effect in their results, but they do not pursue the
issue.
This paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2.2, I use an example to illustrate the idea of
natural hedging. In Section 2.3, using market quotes of single–premium immediate annuities
(SPIA) from A. M. Best, I find empirical support for natural hedging. That is, insurers
that naturally hedge mortality risks have a competitive advantages over otherwise similar
insurers. In Section 2.4, I propose and price a mortality swap between life insurers and
annuity insurers. Section 2.5 is the conclusion and summary.
2.2 Example
This example illustrates the idea of a natural hedge. Consider a portfolio of life contingent
liabilities consisting of whole life insurance policies written on lives age 35 and immediate
life annuities written on lives age 65. If mortality improves, what happens to the insurer’s
total liability? We know that on average, the insurer will have a loss on the annuity business
and a gain on the life insurance business. If mortality declines, the effects are interchanged.
This example shows what can happen if mortality risk increases as a result of a common
shock. Here are my assumptions:
1. Mortality for age 35 is based on the 1990-95 Society of Actuaries Male Basic Table and
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the table for age 65 is based on the 1996 US Individual Annuity Mortality Male Basic
Table.
2. The annuity has an annual benefit of 510 and it is issued as an immediate annuity at
age 65.
3. The face amount of life insurance on age 35 is 100, 000 and the life insurance is issued
at age 35. For this amount of insurance, the present value of liabilities under the life
insurance and under the annuity are about equal.
4. Life insurance premiums and annuity benefits are paid annually. Death benefits are
paid at the end of the year of death.
5. The initial number of lives insured, `35, is 10,000 which is the same as that of annuitants
`65.
6. The mortality shock  is expressed as a percentage of the force of mortality µx+t, so it
ranges from -1 to 1, that is, −1 ≤  ≤ 1 with probability 1. Without the shock, the
survival probability for a life age x at year t is px+t = exp(−µx+t). With the shock,
the new survival probability p
′
x+t can be expressed as:
p
′
x+t = (e
−µx+t)1− = (px+t)1−.
If 0 <  ≤ 1, mortality experience improves. If −1 ≤  < 0, mortality experience
deteriorates.
7. The term structure of interest rates is flat; there is a single interest rate, i = 0.06.
2.2.1 Life Insurance
For the life insurance, the present value of 1 paid at the end of the year of death is vk+1 and
the expected present value is
Ax =
∞∑
k=0
vk+1kpxqx+k
where x is the age when the policy issued (x = 35 in this example). For a benefit of f the
expected present value is fAx.
The present value of 1 per year, paid at the beginning of the year until the year of death,
is
a¨K(x) + 1 =
1− vK(x)+1
d
.
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The expected present value
a¨x = E
[
a¨K(x) + 1
]
=
∞∑
k=0
vkkpx.
The net annual premium rate for 1 unit of benefit is determined so that the present value of
net premiums is equal to the present value of benefits. This means
Pxa¨x = Ax
and for a benefit of f the annual premium is
fPx = fAx/a¨x.
If the insured dies at K(x) = t, then the insurer’s net loss is the present value of the
payment, less the present value premiums. For a unit benefit, the loss is
L = vK(x)+1 − Pxa¨K(x) + 1 = vK(x)+1 − Px
1− vK(x)+1
d
.
It follows from the definition of the net premium Px that the expected loss is zero. For
a benefit of f , the loss is fL. Of course, the loss can be negative in which case the result
turned out in the insurer’s favor. On average, the loss is zero.
2.2.2 Annuities
For an annuitant age y, the present value of 1 per year paid at the beginning of the year is
a¨K(y) + 1 =
1− vK(y)+1
d
.
The expected present value
a¨y = E
[
a¨K(y) + 1
]
=
∞∑
k=0
vkkpy.
The policy is purchased with a single payment of a¨y. In my example y = 65 and the mortality
table is based on annuity experience. For an annual benefit of b, the net single premium is
ba¨y. The company’s loss per unit of benefit is
a¨K(y) + 1 − a¨y = 1/d− a¨y − vK(y)+1/d.
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The expected loss is zero.
2.2.3 Portfolio
The portfolio has a life insurance liability to pay a benefit of f at the end of the year of
the death and a liability to pay a benefit of b at the beginning of each year as long as the
annuitant is alive. The total liability is
fvK(x)+1 + ba¨K(y) + 1 .
To offset the liability the company has
fPxa¨K(x) + 1 + ba¨y.
The difference is the total loss:
L = fvK(x)+1 + ba¨K(y) + 1 − fPxa¨K(x) + 1 − ba¨y.
The expected loss is zero. However, this expectation is calculated under the assumption
that the mortality follows the tables assumed in setting the premiums. If we replace the
before–shock lifetimes with the after shock lifetimes, what happens to the loss?
2.2.4 Results
Figure 2.1 shows the percentage deviation of the present value of benefits from the life
insurance premiums and that of annuity payments from the total annuity premium collected
at time t = 0. I also show the percentage of deviation from the present value of total
premiums collected. Each result includes a shock improvement or deterioration relative to
the table mortality, modelled by multiplying the force of mortality by a factor 1−  in each
year. With a small mortality improvement shock  = 0.10, annuity insurers will lose 2.0
percent of their expected total payments. In this scenario, life insurers will gain 5.0 percent
of their expected total payments. If the above life insurance and annuity are written by
the same insurer, the shock has a much smaller effect on its business (a 1.5 percent gain).
With a small mortality bad shock  = −0.10, annuity insurers will gain 1.9 percent of their
expected total payments. In this scenario, life insurers will lose 4.8 percent of their expected
total payments. If the above life insurance and annuity are sold by the same insurer, a bad
shock has little effect on its business (a 1.4 percent loss). When there is a big good shock
 = 0.50, the present value of total annuity payments will increase by 12.5 percent and the
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Figure 2.1: The percentage deviation of the present value of benefits from the life insurance
premiums, that of annuity payments from the total annuity premium collected and that of
total premiums collected at time t = 0. The y–axis represents the percentage loss and the
x–axis represents different levels of shock improvement or deterioration factor .
life insurer will gain 28.0 percent of their total expected payments on average. The overall
effects will be 7.9 percent gain on a big good shock. Writing both life and annuity business
reduces the impact of a big bad shock  = −0.50 to a 7.0 percent loss. I have illustrated
the idea of natural hedging and I conclude that writing both life and annuities does indeed
reduce the insurer’s aggregate mortality risk.
2.3 Empirical Support For Natural Hedging
Life insurance and annuities have become commodity-like goods, meaning that the price
variable is a primary source of competition among insurance industry participants. Through
various marketing campaigns, consumers are well aware whether a price offered by an insurer
is attractive.
Financial theory tells us that systematic risk cannot be diversified away because sys-
tematic risk influences all businesses. This argument, however, was originally intended for
security managers, not corporate managers (Chatterjee and Lubatkin, 1992). Action by
corporate managers may alter the underlying systematic risk profiles of their portfolio of
business (Chatterjee and Lubatkin, 1990; Helfat and Teece, 1987; Peavy, 1984; Salter and
Weinhold, 1979). Thus, while mortality risk may not be hedgeable in financial markets, it
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may be reduced or eliminated by some insurers through reinsurance, natural hedging, and,
I propose, mortality swaps in Section 2.4.
The industrial organization literature offers numerous theoretical and empirical models
that link integration to a reduction of environmental uncertainty (Arrow, 1975; Carlton,
1979; Mitchell, 1978). Applied to the insurance market, these results suggest that an insurer
writing both life insurance and annuities will have reduced risk relative to similar firms
writing one of these products.
2.3.1 Pricing of Unhedgeable Risks
Froot and Stein (1998) investigate the pricing of non–hedgeable risks. We can adapt their
model to an insurer that writes life and annuity business. At the beginning of each of two
periods, defined by time 0, 1 and 2, the company sells policies with uncertain payoffs Z0
and Z1 at time 2. That is, at the time the decisions are made the payoffs are random
variables with known distributions. Each investment payoff is decomposed as a hedgeable
and non–hedgeable component:
Zj = Z
H
j + Z
N
j ,
where j = 0 or 1. The initial portfolio of exposure will result in a time 2 random payoff
of Z0 = µ0 + ε0, where µ0 is the mean and ε0 is a mean-zero disturbance term. In our
case, the initial portfolio of exposure is the original business composition of life insurance
and annuities. The firm invests in a new investment at time 1, e.g. selling new annuity
business. The new investment offers a random payoff of Z1 at time 2, which can be written
as Z1 = µ1+ε1, where µ1 is the mean and ε1 is a mean-zero disturbance term. The risks can
be classified into two categories: (i) perfectly tradeable exposures, which can be unloaded
frictionlessly on fair-market terms, and (ii) completely non-tradeable exposures, which must
be retained by the financial intermediaries no matter what. The disturbance terms, that is,
the pre-existing and new risks, ε0 and ε1, can be decomposed as:
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ε0 = ε
T
0 + ε
N
0 ,
ε1 = ε
T
1 + ε
N
1 ,
where εT0 is the tradeable component of ε0, ε
N
0 is the non-tradeable component, and so forth.
The intermediary’s realized internal wealth at time 1 is denoted by w. The investment at
time 1 requires a cash input of I, which is funded by the internal sources w and external
money e. Thus I = w + e. The investment yields a gross return of F (I). The convex costs
for raising external finance e are given by C(e). This means that the larger the amount that
must be financed externally, the more costly the funds are to raise, i.e. C ′(e) > 0. And the
change rate of cost of funds increases with size of funds raised, i.e. C ′′(e) > 0. The solution
to this intermediary’s time 2 problem can be denoted by the ex post value of the firm, P (w),
as follows:
P (w) = max
e
F (I)− I − C(e), subject to I = w + e.
Froot et al. (1993) and Gron and Winton (2001) show that the company’s required rate
of return µ for pricing its products at time 1 has the form
µ = γcov(ZH1 ,M) +Gcov(Z
N
1 , Z
N
0 ). (2.1)
where G > 0 is the company’s risk aversion factor, γ is the market price of systematic risk,
and M the market return. The second factor in Equation (2.1) shows that µ increases with
the correlation between pre-existing and new unhedgeable risks. If a life insurer is able
to realize natural hedging, then the correlation is reduced, the company required rate of
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return on its products decreases, and therefore it can offer lower prices. In other words, its
annuity prices will be lower than otherwise similar insurers which cannot naturally hedge
their business.
2.3.2 Data, Measures and Methodologies
Data and Measures
The annuity prices are market quotes for single premium immediate annuities (SPIAs) for a
65–year–old male from 1995 to 1998 (Kiczek, 1995, 1996, 1997; A.M.Best, 1998). Each year
the A.M. Best Company surveyed about 100 companies to obtain quotes for the lifetime–only
monthly benefit paid to a 65–year–old male with $100,000 to invest. The performance data
of insurers is obtained from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). I
manually match the A.M. Best data and the NAIC data. The sample includes 322 matched
observations from which I extracted two sub–samples of companies that write more than a
small amount of annuity business (defined below).
I transform each quote from a rate of payment per month to an equivalent price, as
follows. If m is the monthly payment rate per $100,000 and Price is what the company
would charge for an annuity of 1 per year for the annuitant’s lifetime, then
100, 000 = 12mPrice and
Price =
100, 000
12m
.
The ratio of life insurance reserves to total annuity and life insurance reserves, denoted
“Ratio”, reflects the level of natural hedging provided by life insurance business to annuity
business. The idea is that, of two otherwise similar annuity writers, the one with the higher
Ratio value has a better hedge against longevity risk. The better hedge may allow for lower
provision for risk in its premiums, and thus lower prices. In addition, this ratio determines
the degree to which the insurer writes annuity business. For example, if the ratio is less than
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0.90, the company annuity reserve is more than 10 percent of the total. The one sample
regression includes sample observations for which Ratio < 0.90, i.e., at least 10 percent of
the company’s reserve is for its annuity business. This sample rules out companies with very
little annuity business. The sample size is N = 299. The other sub–sample consists of those
observations for which the company has Ratio < 0.75 so that its life insurance reserves are
less than 75 percent of its total reserves. The size of this sample is N = 243.1
In an efficient, competitive insurance market, the price of insurance will be inversely
related to firm default risk (Phillips et al., 1998; Cummins, 1988; Merton, 1973). That is,
a company with more default risk would have lower annuity prices. I use the A. M. Best
rating for the year prior to the quote as a measure of default risk of annuity insurers. I use
the rating to define a numerical variable, Lrate, as follows: if A.M. Best rating equals to
“A++” or “A+”, then Lrate =1; if A.M. Best rating equals to “A” or “A-”, then Lrate =2;
if A.M. Best rating equals to “B++” or “B+”, then Lrate =3; if A.M. Best rating equals to
“B” or “B-”, then Lrate =4; and so on. This leads to the hypothesis that higher values of
Lrate occur with lower annuity prices.
Other factors which may affect the annuity prices are also included in my regression
model. I use the logarithm of the company’s total gross annuity reserve, log(Resann), to
represent the degree to which the company writes annuity business. The logarithm of the
company’s total assets, log(Tasset), controls for the size of the company. The sum of com-
missions and expenses divided by total written premium, Comexp, measures the company’s
expenses. Higher expenses should be related to higher annuity prices. Panel A and B in
Table 2.1 report the summary statistics of my two sub-samples.
1If we eliminate more companies in the range 0.5 < Ratio < 0.75, where we might see a stronger effect of
natural hedging, then the sample sizes are too small to get adequate significance.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics from 1995 to 1998 (dollar amounts in millions)
Panel A
Variable Description Ratio < 0.90 (N = 299)
Mean Minimum Median Maximum
m Annuity payment rate 765.17 653.00 766.75 992.00
Price Equivalent price 10.93 8.40 10.87 12.76
Resann Annuity gross reserve 3,490,298 5,192 1,093,109 43,011,379
Reslife Life insurance gross reserve 2,741,170 0 718,905 45,174,284
Ratio Reslife
Reslife+Resann
0.44 0.00 0.47 0.89
Tasset Total assets 9,069,208 33,351 2,996,356 127,097,380
Lrate Lagged A. M. Best rating 1.59 1 2 4
Comexp Commissions+expenses
Net premiums
23.21% 2.50% 21.20% 102.20%
Panel B
Variable Description Ratio < 0.75 (N = 243)
Mean Min Median Max
m Annuity payment rate 765.00 653.00 767.00 992.00
Price Equivalent price 10.93 8.40 10.86 12.76
Resann Annuity gross reserve 4,082,579 10,535 1,466,230 43,011,379
Reslife Life insurance gross reserve 2,412,583 0 629,510 45,174,284
Ratio Reslife
Reslife+Resann
0.35 0.00 0.37 0.75
Tasset Total assets (in millions) 9,079,913 33,351 3,256,612 127,097,380
Lrate Lagged A. M. Best rating 1.58 1 2 4
Comexp Commissions+expenses
Net premiums
21.95% 2.50% 20.30% 93.50%
Methodologies
I use the pooled ordinary least square technique to investigate the relation between annuity
prices and natural hedging, controlling for size, default risk, expenses and year effects. My
regression model is expressed as follows:
Price = α+ β Ratio + γ1 log(Resann) + γ2 log(Tasset) + γ3 Lrate (2.2)
+ γ4Comexp + δ1D1996 + δ2D1997 + δ3D1998 + ,
where D1996, D1997 and D1998 are year dummies and  is the error term.
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Under my hypothesis, the coefficient β should be negative indicating that natural hedging
allows for lower annuity prices. I run the regression for two sub–samples determined by the
proportion of annuity business the company has written, as represented by Ratio.2
2.3.3 Findings and Implications
The coefficient estimates are presented in Table 2.2. White statistics (Greene, 2000) indicate
that the distribution of errors is not heteroscedastic; OLS is appropriate. The signs of all
the coefficients are consistent with my hypothesis. Since β is negative, annuity writers
with more life insurance business tend to have lower annuity prices than similar companies
with the same size and rating but less life insurance business. My story about natural
hedging is consisistent with this empirical conclusion. The regression results suggest that
annuity writing companies benefit from natural hedging, although these companies may not
be making explicit natural hedging decisions.
When annuity business increases relative to life insurance business, the need for longevity
risk hedging increases. When I focus on those observations with the proportion of annuity
reserve to the sum of annuity reserve and life insurance reserve higher than 25 percent, that
is Ratio < 0.75, the absolute value of its coefficient (-0.5487) controlling year effects is larger
than that of the coefficient (-0.4777) obtained for the case when Ratio < 0.90. This suggests
that when an annuity writer sells relatively more annuities, the increase in the life insurance
hedge has a higher marginal effect in lowering the annuity price.
2The proportion of annuity reserves to the sum of annuity reserves and life insurance reserves mea-
sures the longevity risk exposure of an annuity insurer; this ratio is the complement of the variable Ratio.
Resann
Reslife+Resann = 1− Ratio.
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How do we interpret the coefficient of Ratio (−0.5487) when Ratio < 0.75? Suppose an
life insurer has 5 percent of its business in life insurance and 95 percent of its business in
annuities. It sells $100,000 life-only SPIAs to males aged 65 at the market average monthly
payouts $765. If it can realize full natural hedging, that is, 50 percent of business in life
insurance and 50 percent business in annuities, its SPIA monthly payouts can be increased
by $18, that is, from $765 to $783 because it can reduce the risk premium in its price. Its
SPIA prices can be more attractive than other similar competitors.
The signs of other variables are consistent with my expectations. The regression results
suggest that when a life insurer writes more annuities, its annuity price goes down because
the sign of the annuity business variable, log(Resann), is negative. It implies that economic
scale exists in annuity sales. The size of an insurer is positively related to the price of its SPIA
which may reflect the market power of bigger firms. This is consistent with prior research
(Sommer, 1996; Froot and O’Connel, 1997). My default risk measure Lrate has a negative
and significant coefficient, consistent with previous literature (Berger et al., 1992; Sommer,
1996). It implies that the higher default risk is associated with lower price all else equal.
The sign of the coefficient of the expense variable log(Comexp) is positive and significant.
Higher expenses are consistent with higher prices. The coefficients of year dummies are all
significant at 1 percent level but not reported here.
2.4 Mortality Swaps
In section 2.3, I conclude that natural hedging may allow an annuity writer to lower its
prices. However, it may be too expensive and unrealistic for an annuity writer to utilize
natural hedging by changing its business composition. If we consider a corporate pension
plan as an annuity writer, it may not even be legal for it to issue life insurance. Even for
an insurer specialized in annuities, entering the life insurance business may not be practical.
Moreover, natural hedging is not a static process. Dynamic natural hedging is required
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for new business. If an insurer is able to take advantage of natural hedging at a low cost
by financial innovation, it can gain competitive advantage in the market by selling annuity
products at lower prices. I propose mortality swaps to accomplish this goal.
2.4.1 Basic Ideas
I am suggesting that a market for mortality swaps may develop in which brokers and dealers
offer swaps to annuity writers and separately to life insurers. The broker may match each
annuity deal with a life deal or manage its portfolio of mortality swaps on an aggregate
basis. As a start toward development of such a market, I propose a market–based approach
to valuing each side of a mortality swap. The annuity (or survivor risk) side is priced in a
way that is consistent with observed prices in the annuity market. Similarly the mortality
(or death risk) side is consistent with the life insurance market.
Dowd et al. (2004) propose the possible uses of survivor swaps as instruments for manag-
ing, hedging and trading mortality-dependent risks. Their proposed survivor swap involves
transferring a mortality risk related to a specific population with another population, that
is, one specific longevity risk for another specific longevity risk. Their mortality swap can
be used to diversify the longevity risks. However, the survivor swap does not hedge a good
shock or a bad shock that strikes across populations (a systematic risk). My approach is
different and it can hedge these shocks. Without any collateral, the swap payments are
subject to counter–party risk. That is, one party, the broker or the insurer, may default. I
ignore this issue and assume all parties fulfill their contractual obligations. Mortality swaps
are described as follows.
Each year the annuity writer pays floating cash flows to the life insurer based on the
actual number of deaths in the life insurer’s specified portfolio of policies. This provides a
benefit to the life insurer if mortality deteriorates, which the annuity writer may pay from
its gain due to reduced annuity benefits.
At the same time the life insurer pays an annuity benefit based on the actual number of
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Figure 2.2: Mortality Swap Diagram.
survivors in the annuity writer’s specified portfolio of annuities. If, for example, mortality
improves, the life insurer pays the annuity writer but it has a gain on its own life insurance
policies. There are no other swap payments. Figure 2.2 illustrates the mortality swap cash
flows.
2.4.2 Mortality Swap Design
In order to keep the notation fairly simple, I assume that all of the lives in the life insurance
portfolio are subject to the same mortality table, denoted by (x), for pricing purposes. At
time 0 we have a portfolio of `x lives each insured for an amount f . The random number
of survivors3 to age x + k is denoted `x+k. The number of deaths in the year (k, k + 1)
is dx+k = `x+k − `x+k+1. The distribution of dx+k is binomial with parameters m = `x
3This is a slight abuse of standard actuarial notation in which `x+k denotes the expected number of
survivors.
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and q = kpx − k+1px, with q calculated using the mortality table specified at time 0.4 The
life insurer’s aggregate death benefit payment in year k + 1 amounts to fdx+k. At time
0, the expected value is E(fdx+k) = fm(kpx − k+1px). The insurer’s risk is that actual
life insurance benefit payments exceed the expected value and so it swaps, agreeing to pay
annuity payments (defined below) in exchange for a payment in year k + 1. The payment
from the swap is
f(dx+k − E(dx+k))+ =

f(dx+k − E(dx+k)) if dx+k > E(dx+k)
0 otherwise
for k = 0, 1, . . . . (2.3)
The swap payment limits the net aggregate life insurance benefit from the life insurer to
the expected value in each year. Of course, there is a price: The life insurer must provide
annuity swap payments when the annuity writer needs them.
The annuity writer pays a benefit b per year to each survivor of an initial cohort of `y
lives all subject to the same table at time 0 (but usually different from the lives on which the
life insurance is written). The distribution of `y+k is binomial with parameters m = `y and
q = kpk. The total benefit paid at time k is b`y+k and the annuity writer needs relief when
it exceeds its expected value. This defines the life insurer’s swap payment to the annuity
writer:
b(`y+k − E(`y+k))+ =

b(`x+k − E(`x+k)) if `y+k > E(`y+k)
0 otherwise
for k = 0, 1, . . . . (2.4)
This is the net cash flow the annuity writer pays in the year (k, k + 1):
4In Section 4.5 in Chapter 4, I show how to model the shift of the selected mortality table by using a
compound Poisson process.
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Annuity benefits b`y+k
To the life insurer f(dx+k − E(dx+k))+
From the life insurer b(`y+k − E(`y+k))+
Total

b`y+k if dx+k ≤ E(dx+k), `y+k ≤ E(`y+k)
b`y+k + f(dx+k − E(dx+k)) if dx+k > E(dx+k), `y+k ≤ E(`y+k)
bE(`y+k) if dx+k ≤ E(dx+k), `y+k > E(`y+k)
bE(`y+k) + f(dx+k − E(dx+k)) if dx+k > E(dx+k), `y+k > E(`y+k)
Here is the life insurer’s net cash flow in the year (k, k + 1):
Death benefits fdx+k
From annuity writer f(dx+k − E(dx+k))+
To annuity writer b(`y+k − E(`y+k))+
Total

fdx+k if dx+k ≤ E(dx+k), `y+k ≤ E(`y+k)
fE(dx+k) if dx+k > E(dx+k), `y+k ≤ E(`y+k)
fdx+k + b(`y+k − E(`y+k)) if dx+k ≤ E(dx+k), `y+k > E(`y+k)
fE(dx+k) + b(`y+k − E(`y+k)) if dx+k > E(dx+k), `y+k > E(`y+k)
In each year the swap rearranges the sum of annuity and life insurance benefit payments.
The sum is always b`y+k + fdx+k, but the parties swap adverse outcomes. They need not
swap all of their business. The swap contract could be adjusted so that the swap payment
triggers are higher than the expected values, for example, or the contract could specify upper
bounds on the annual swap payments.
The underlying portfolios of insured lives and annuitants should be selected so that they
are subject to the same general mortality change factors. Change factors can move mortality
either way. The 1918 flu epidemic is an example which, although the effects varied by age,
had a negative impact across populations. Providing pure water and sanitary sewers in
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European and American cities improved mortality at all ages. The invention of penicillin
had a positive effect across populations.
2.4.3 One-Factor Wang Transform
Cairns et al. (2006) discuss a theoretical framework for pricing mortality derivatives and
valuing liabilities which incorporate mortality guarantees. Their stochastic mortality models
require certain reasonable criteria in terms of their potential future dynamics and mortality
curve shapes. Mortality changes in a complex manner, influenced by socioeconomic factors,
biological variables, government policies, environmental influences, health conditions and
health behaviors. Not all of these factors improve with time and, moreover, opinions on
future mortality trends vary widely (Buettner, 2002; Hayflick, 2002; Goss et al., 1998; Rogers,
2002). Even if we could settle on a such a dynamic framework, estimation of the parameters
may be very difficult. I take a different, static approach.
Wang (1996, 2000, 2001) has developed a method of pricing risks that unifies financial and
insurance pricing theories. This method can be used to price mortality bonds (Lin and Cox,
2005). Now I apply this method to mortality swaps. Consider a random payment X paid
at time T . If the cumulative distribution function is F (x), then a distorted or transformed
distribution F ∗(x) is determined by parameter λ according to the equation
F ∗(x) = Φ[Φ−1(F (x))− λ]. (2.5)
where Φ(x) is the standard normal cdf. The idea is to determine λ so that the time 0 price
of X is its discounted expected value using the transformed distribution. Then the formula
for the price is
vTE
∗(X) = vT
∫
xdF ∗(x) (2.6)
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where vT the discount factor determined by the market for risk free bonds at time 0. Thus,
for an insurer’s given liability X with cumulative density function F (x), the Wang transform
will produce a risk–adjusted density function F ∗(x). The mean value under F ∗(x), denoted
by E∗[X], is the risk–adjusted fair-value of X at time T . Wang’s paper describes the utility
of this approach. It generalizes well known techniques in finance and actuarial science. My
idea is to use observed annuity prices to estimate the market price of risk for annuities, then
use the same distribution to price the annuity side of a mortality swap. For the life insurance
side I use the same idea. Term life insurance prices to determine the market price of risk in
the life insurance market, giving us the appropriate distribution for pricing the life insurance
side of the swap.
The Wang transform is based on the idea that the life insurance or annuity market price
takes into account the uncertainty in the mortality table, as well as the uncertainty in the
lifetime of a life insured or an annuitant once the table is given. The market price of risk
does not and need not reflect the risk in interest rates because I am assuming that mortality
and interest rate risks are independent. Moreover, I am assuming that investors accept the
same transformed distribution and independence assumption for pricing mortality swaps.
The Wang transform is an equilibrium model that can recover the CAPM model. Under
the normal distribution assumption, the market price of risk of an asset in the classical
CAPM, λ = [E(r)− rf ]/σ, is the excess return per unit of volatility. For insurance risks, it
is the risk load per unit of volatility. The Wang transform takes the equilibrium perspective
of the CAPM model. If the return of an asset or risk r is normally distributed with mean
µ and standard deviation σ, then the transformed distribution is also normal with mean
µ∗ = µ− λσ and standard deviation σ∗ = σ.
Proof. If r is normal with mean µ and variance σ2, then
F (r) = Φ
(
r − µ
σ
)
.
The Wang transform is given by
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F ∗(r) = Φ[Φ−1(F (r)) + λ]
= Φ
(
r − µ
σ
+ λ
)
= Φ
(
r − (µ− λσ)
σ
)
.
That is, the transformed distribution preserves the normal distribution with mean
µ∗ = µ− λσ (2.7)
and standard deviation σ∗ = σ. 
In equilibrium, I expect that the risk-adjusted return µ∗ equals to the risk free rate rf .
Therefore I can rewrite equation (2.7) as
λ =
µ− µ∗
σ
=
µ− rf
σ
. (2.8)
This is the market price of risk in the CAPM. Moreover, the Wang transform can reproduce
the Black–Scholes model with lognormally–distributed assets (Wang, 2002).
The Wang transform has a more desirable property than the CAPM. The CAPM cannot
be applied to the situation when the distributions are not normally distributed. So it limits
the CAPM’s application in the insurance area where insurance loss distributions are skewed.
Contrast to that of the CAPM, the cumulative distribution function FX(x) in the Wang
transform can be some distributions other than normal distributions.
Market price of risk
For the annuity distribution function Fa(t) = tq65, I use the 1996 IAM 2000 Basic Table for
a male life age sixty–five. Then assuming an expense factor equal to 4 percent, I use the
1996 market quotes of qualified immediate annuities (Kiczek, 1996) and the US Treasury
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yield curve on December 30, 1996 to get the market price of risk λa by solving the following
equation5 numerically for λ:
1000(1− 0.04) = 7.48
∞∑
j=1
vj/12[1− F ∗a (j/12)] (2.9)
The variable vj/12 is the discount factor at time 0 for a payment of 1 after j/12 years. And
[1− F ∗a (j/12)] is the survival probability usually denoted j/12p65, but using the transformed
distribution. This has to be solved numerically for λa.
Thus I determine the market price of risk for annuitants is λa = 0.2134. I think of
the 1996 IAM 2000 Basic Table as the actual or physical distribution, which requires a
distortion to obtain market prices. Figure 2.3 shows the graphs of Fa(t) and F
∗
a (t). The
distorted distribution lies to the right and above the physical distribution. This indicates
that the market view of annuitant mortality is that it will improve relative to the base table.
Similarly, for the life insurance distribution function Fl(t) = tq35, I use the 1990-95 SOA
Life Insurance Basic Table for a male life age thirty–five. A.M.Best (1996) reports market
quotes for both preferred non-smokers and standard smokers. The 1990-95 SOA Basic Table
is created based on a mixture of smokers and non-smokers. I calculate a weighted average
of term life insurance prices ($507.48) using weights based on the incidence of smoking in
the US population as reported by the Center for the Disease Control6 in 1995. Assuming an
expense factor equal to 10 percent, I use the 1996 average market quotes of ten–year level
$250,000 term life insurance (A.M.Best, 1996) based on 97 companies and the US Treasury
yield curve on December 30, 1996 to get the market price of risk λl = 0.1933 by solving the
5The analogous equations in Lin and Cox (2005) are incorrect, although the solutions to the equations
as stated here, are correct.
6Source: www.cdc.gov. About 57 percent former and current male smokers and 43 percent male non-
smokers.
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Figure 2.3: The result of applying the Wang transform to the survival distribution based on
1996 IAM experience for males age 65 and prices from Kiczek (1996).
following equation:
507.48× (1− 0.10) = 250, 000
9∑
k=0
vk+1 [F
∗(k + 1)− F ∗(k)] (2.10)
where vk+1 is the discount factor for a payment after k + 1 years. A positive life insurance
market price of risk means the market anticipates improved mortality for insured lives,
relative to the base table.
Mortality Swap Pricing
I can price each side of the swap now. This will allow me to determine factors b and f
for which the two market prices are equal so no cash is paid by either party to initate the
contract; they make only contractual swap payments.
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The market price of the payment f(dx+k−E(dx+k))+ for year k is its discounted expected
value fE∗[(dx+k − E(dx+k))+]. The “*-distribution” of dx+k is binomial with parameters
m = `x and q = F
∗(k + 1)− F ∗(k).7 For large m (over 20 is often suggested), the binomial
distribution is approximately normal and I am thinking of portfolios of hundreds of lives.
Thus, to a very good approximation,
E∗[(dx+k − E(dx+k))+] ≈ σkE[(X − xk)+]
where X is a standard normal variable, µk = mq and σk =
√
mq(1− q) are the mean and
standard deviation of dx+k and
xk =
E(dx+k)− µk
σk
.
For a standard normal variable X, there is a formula for this (Lin and Cox, 2005):
E[(X − x)+] = φ(x)− x[1− Φ(x)] (2.11)
where φ(x) = Φ′(x) = e
−x2/2√
2pi
. Thus we can calculate the market price of the life insurance
benefit swap payments as
f
∞∑
k=0
vk+1E
∗[(dx+k − E(dx+k))+] = f
∞∑
k=0
vk+1σk[φ(xk)− xk[1− Φ(xk)]]. (2.12)
I apply this same technique to calculate the market value of the annuity benefit swap pay-
ments. I only change the definitions of µk and σk.
b
∞∑
k=0
vk+1E
∗[(`y+k − E(`y+k))+] = b
∞∑
k=0
vk+1σk[φ(xk)− xk[1− Φ(xk)]] (2.13)
The distribution of `y+k is binomial with m = `y and q = 1−F ∗(k). The mean are standard
7The “*-distribution” shows the market expectation of future mortality table shift.
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deviation are, again, µk = mq and σk =
√
mq(1− q). The remaining parameter is
xk =
E(`y+k)− µk
σk
.
I calculate these values for a 10–year swap, using m = 10, 000 lives in the annuity and life
insurance portfolios. The market value of the life insurance payments, for a death benefit of
$1,000,000, is $52,758. This is about 1.6 percent of the net term life insurance premium.
For the annuity payment side of the swap, the market value per one dollar of annual
benefit, again for 10,000 lives, is $1,690. To adjust the average amount of insurance f per
term policy to make each side of the swap have the same price, we have
1, 690 = f
52, 758
100, 000
or f = 3, 203. Thus for each dollar of annual annuity benefit we must have $3,203 of death
benefit to make the prices equal at time 0. Then each party will have the benefit of natural
hedging for 10 years. Even though the prices are equal at time 0, the mortality may move
one way or the other so that the future market value favors one party. The swap has to be
revalued each year to properly reflect each company’s position as it may be either an asset
or liability.
2.5 Conclusions and Discussion
Natural hedging utilizes the opposite reaction of life insurance and annuities to the same
mortality change to stabilize aggregate cash outflows. My empirical evidences suggest natural
hedging is an important factor contributing to annuity price differences after I control for
other variables. These differences become more significant for those insurers selling relatively
more annuity business. I expect that life insurers may reach the same conclusion.
Most insurance companies still have considerable net exposures to mortality risks even
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if they reduce their exposure by pooling individual mortality risk and by balancing their
annuity positions against their life positions (Dowd et al., 2004). Natural hedging is feasible
and mortality swaps make it available widely.
I show how to design a mortality swap between a life insurer and annuity writer to create
a natural hedge. Compared with traditional reinsurance and other derivatives, such as mor-
tality bonds, mortality swaps may be arranged at possibly lower costs and in a more flexible
way to suit diverse circumstances. Thus, there are good reasons to anticipate increased
activity in mortality swaps between life insurers and annuity insurers.
3
Securitization of Mortality Risks in Life
Annuities
Securitization with payments linked to explicit mortality events provides a new investment
opportunity to investors and financial institutions. Moreover, mortality-linked securities
provide an alternative risk management tool for insurers. The purpose of this paper is to
study the securitization of mortality risks, especially the longevity risk inherent in a portfolio
of annuities or in a pension plan.
30
CHAPTER 3. SECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 31
3.1 Introduction
Securities with mortality risk as a component have been around a long time. These securities
arise as securitization of portfolios of life insurance or annuity policies. The risks underlying
a life insurance or annuity portfolio include interest rate risk, policyholder lapse risk, as
well as mortality or longevity risk. In these transactions, the positive future net cash flow
from the policies is dedicated to pay the bondholders. Therefore, they are similar to asset
securitization. Cummins (2004) surveys recent life insurance securitization transactions,
including these asset-type securities.
However, securitization of pure mortality or longevity risk is a recent and potentially im-
portant innovation in financial markets. Pure mortality or longevity securitization is more
like property-linked catastrophe bonds than the common asset-type life insurance securitiza-
tion. This is because, like that of a property-linked catastrophe bond based on earthquake
or hurricane losses, the payment of a mortality security is subject only to a well-defined risk.
In the case of a mortality bond, the event might be a sudden spike in death rates, which
may be caused by a flu epidemic.
Catastrophes impose a big potential problem for a life insurer’s solvency since fatalities
from natural and man–made disasters may be tremendous. For example, the earthquake and
tsunami in southern Asia and eastern Africa in December 2004 killed 182,340 people and
resulted in 129,897 missing (Guy Carpenter, 2005). Although most of the victims did not
own life insurance, the life insurance industry may not have enough capacity to cover this
type of catastrophe losses if such an event were to occur in a more economically developed
region where most people buy life insurance. Cummins and Doherty (1997) noted that “a
closer look at the industry reveals that the capacity to bear a large catastrophic loss is
actually much more limited than the aggregate statistics would suggest.” Securities linked
to catastrophe death risk, such as the Swiss Re bond, are discussed in Chapter 4.
This paper focuses on the other side of mortality risk — longevity risk. Although mor-
tality improves over time, future rates of improvement are uncertain. At the same time
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we are seeing, especially in the U.S., a trend to shift longevity risk to individuals. In the
US, defined benefit pension plans are converting to defined contribution plans. Proposed
Social Security reforms further shift mortality risk to individuals. Thus, there should be an
increased demand for individual annuities. As demand for annuities increases, the annuity
insurers’ need for risk management of potential mortality improvements will increase.
As a new risk management tool, mortality securitization enhances the capacity of the
life insurance industry by transferring its catastrophic losses to financial markets. Jaffee
and Russell (1997) and Froot (2001) argue that insurance securitization offers a potentially
more efficient mechanism for financing catastrophe losses than conventional insurance and
reinsurance. Securitization brings more capital and provides innovative contracting features
for the life insurance industry to bear potential mortality shocks, thus avoiding the market
disruptions caused by disruptive reinsurance price and availability cycles. Moreover, because
mortality securities may be uncorrelated with financial markets, they provide a valuable
new source of diversification for market participants (Cox et al., 2000; Litzenberger et al.,
1996; Canter et al., 1997). Finally, Cummins (2004) categorizes securitization as arbitrage
opportunities or new classes of risk that enhance market efficiency. This paper proposes a
feasible way to securitize longevity risk.
In section 3.2, I describe securitization of longevity risk with a mortality bond or a
mortality swap. In section 3.3, I illustrate how insurers (or reinsurers or pension plans)
can use mortality–based securities to manage longevity risk. In section 3.4, I show how
good is the hedge provided by my proposed mortality bond. In section 3.5, I describe the
difficulties arising in making mortality projections. I discuss annuity data, including the
Individual Annuity Mortality tables and the Group Annuity Experience Mortality (GAEM)
reports from Reports of the Transactions of the Society of Actuaries (TSA). Section 3.6 is
for discussion and conclusions.
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3.2 Mortality Securitization
I propose a new type of mortality bond which is similar to the Swiss Re deal discussed in
Section 4.3.1 but focused on longevity. The structure is similar to other deals. Generally, the
life-based securitizations follow the same structure as the so called catastrophe-risk bonds.
There have been more than thirty catastrophe bond transactions reported in the financial
press and many papers written about them. Mortality bonds are different in several impor-
tant ways. For example, deviation from mortality forecasts may occur gradually over a long
period, as opposed to a sudden property portfolio loss. However, in both transactions, costs
are likely to be high relative to reinsurance on a transaction basis.
In both transactions, the insurer (reinsurer or annuity provider) purchases reinsurance
from a special purpose company (SPC). The SPC issues bonds to investors. The bond
contract and reinsurance convey the risk from the annuity provider to the investors. The
SPC invests the reinsurance premium and cash from the sale of the bonds in default-free
securities. I will show how this can be set up to allow the SPC to pay the benefits under the
terms of the reinsurance with certainty.
3.2.1 Example
As an example of a mortality securitization, consider an insurer1 that must pay immediate
life annuities to `x annuitants
2 all aged x initially. Set the payment rate at 1,000 per year
per annuitant. Let `x+t denote the number of survivors to year t. The insurer pays 1, 000`x+t
to its annuitants, which is random, as viewed from time 0. I will define a bond contract to
hedge the risk that this portion of the insurer’s payments to its annuitants exceeds an agreed
upon level.
The insurer buys insurance from its SPC for a premium P at time 0. The insurance
1The “insurer” could be an annuity writer, annuity reinsurer or private pension plan. The counter party
could be a life insurer or investor.
2The security could be based on a mortality index rather than an actual portfolio. This will avoid the
moral hazard problem, but it introduces basis risk.
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contract has a schedule of fixed trigger levels Xt such that the SPC pays the insurer the
excess of the actual payments over the trigger. In year t the insurer pays amount 1000`x+t
to its annuitants. If the payments exceed the trigger for that year, it collects the excess from
the SPC, up to a maximum amount. Let us say that the maximum is stated as a multiple
of the rate of annuity payments 1000C. Thus in each year t = 1, 2, . . . , T the insurer collects
the benefit Bt from the SPC determined by this formula:
Bt =

1000C if `x+t > Xt + C
1000(`x+t −Xt) if Xt < `x+t ≤ Xt + C
0 if `x+t ≤ Xt
(3.1)
The insurer specifies the annuitant pool in much the same way that mortgage loans
are identified in construction of a mortgage–backed security. The insurer’s cash flow to
annuitants 1000`x+t at time t is offset by positive cash flow Bt from the insurance:
Insurer’s Net Cash Flow = 1000`x+t −Bt (3.2)
=

1000(`x+t − C) if `x+T > C +Xt
1000Xt if Xt < `x+t ≤ C +Xt
1000`x+t if `x+t ≤ Xt
For this structure, there is no basis risk in the reinsurance. Basis risk arises when the
hedge is not exactly the same as the reinsurer’s risk. The mortality bond covers the same
risk, so there is no basis risk. This is in contrast to the Swiss Re deal, which is based on a
population index rather than a portfolio of Swiss Re’s life insurance polices (or its clients’
policies). While there is no basis risk, the contract does not provide full coverage. I will
study the distribution of the present value of the excess later.
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Figure 3.1: Mortality Bond Cash Flow Diagram.
3.2.2 Bonds
Here is a description of the cash flows between the SPC, the investors and the insurer as
illustrated in Figure 3.1. The SPC payments to the investors are:
Dt =

0 if `x+t > C +Xt
1000C −Bt if Xt < `x+t ≤ C +Xt
1000C if `x+t ≤ Xt
(3.3)
=

0 if `x+t > C +Xt
1000(C +Xt − `x+t) if Xt < `x+t ≤ C +Xt
1000C if `x+t ≤ Xt
(3.4)
where Dt is the total coupon paid to investors. The maximum value of `x+t is `x, attained
if nobody dies, but from the perspective of 0, it is a random value between 0 and `x. Let
the market price of the mortality bond be denoted by V . The aggregate cash flow out of the
SPC is
Bt +Dt = 1000C (3.5)
for each year t = 1, ..., T and the principal amount 1000F at t = T . The SPC will perform
on its insurance and bond contract commitments with probability 1, provided P + V is at
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least equal to the price W of a default free fixed coupon bond with annual coupon 1000C
and principal 1000F valued with the bond market discount factors:
P + V ≥ W = 1000Fd(0, T ) +
T∑
k=1
1000Cd(0, k). (3.6)
The discount factors d(0, k) can be taken from the bond market at the time the insurance
is issued. In other words, if the insurance premium and proceeds from sale of the mortality
bonds are sufficient, the SPC can buy a straight bond and have exactly the required coupon
cash flow it needs to meet its obligation to the insurer and the investors. Each year SPC
receives 1000C as the straight bond coupon and then pays Dt to investors and Bt to the
insurer. It is always the case that 1000C = Dt+Bt is exactly enough to meet its obligations.
Thus we see how to set up a longevity risk bond contract for which the longevity risk
over T years is passed to the capital market almost completely. Of course, the price of the
mortality bond is yet to be addressed. We need to see how likely it is that some payments will
be covered. That is, how good is the insurance coverage? From the investor’s perspective,
how likely is it that they will miss a coupon? At time T , the SPC will have the accumulated
value of P + V −W and this is positive with probability 1. This future value belongs to the
insurer since it is the sole owner of the SPC. For this paper I assume P + V = W .
3.2.3 Swaps
The same cash flows, Bt to the insurer and Dt to the bondholders, can be arranged with swap
agreements and no principal payment at time T . However, without the principal as collateral,
the swap payments are subject to counter–party risk. Assuming there is no counter–party
risk, the equivalent swaps contracts are described as follows. Since there is no counter–party
risk, the insurer’s payment of P at time 0 can be replaced by level annual payments of x
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where
P = x
T∑
k=1
d(0, k).
Then each year, the insurer pays x to the SPC (or a swap originator) and gets a floating
benefit Bt, t = 1, 2, ..., T . There are no other payments. This is a fixed for floating swap
from the insurer’s perspective. So long as there is no counter–party risk, the insurer can
get essentially the same reinsurance benefit from a swap. The swap might be provided by a
broker or investment banker.
The same analysis applies to the bondholder’s cash flows. In place of paying V for the
mortality bond, they can pay a fixed amount y each year in order to receive variable coupons
Dt, where
y
T∑
k=1
d(0, k) + 1000Fd(0, T ) =
T∑
k=1
E∗[Dt]d(0, k) + 1000Fd(0, T ).
So
y
T∑
k=1
d(0, k) =
T∑
k=1
E∗[Dt]d(0, k).
The mean value E∗[Dt] defines the risk–adjusted fair value of Dt at time t. Then in each year,
the SPC gets x + y, exactly enough to finance its obligation Bt + Dt. The only difference
is collateral. If there is no possibility of default on the fixed payments, then SPC will
always have just enough cash to meet its floating payment obligations. In this case, swaps
can replace the mortality bond. This may save transaction costs. The trade–off is that it
introduces default risk.
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3.3 Pricing Mortality Risk Bonds
I apply the one-factor Wang transform (Wang, 1996, 2000, 2001) introduced in Section 2.4.3
to price mortality risk bonds. Let Φ(x) be the standard normal cumulative distribution
function with a probability density function
φ(x) =
1√
2pi
e−x
2/2
for all x. Wang defines the distortion operator as
gλ(u) = Φ[Φ
−1(u)− λ] (3.7)
for 0 < u < 1 and a parameter λ.
3.3.1 Market Price of Risk
First I estimate the market price of risk λ. I define my transformed distribution F ∗ as:
F ∗(t) = gλ(F )(t) = Φ[Φ−1(tq65)− λ] (3.8)
For the distribution function F (t) = tq65, I use the 1996 IAM 2000 Basic Table for a male
life age 65 and, separately, for a female life age 65. Assuming an expense factor equal to
6 percent, I use the August 1996 market quotes of qualified immediate annuities (Kiczek,
1996) and the US Treasury yield curve on August 15, 1996 to get the market price of risk λ
by solving the following equations numerically:
1, 000× (1− 0.06) = 7.48× 12a(12)65 for males, (3.9)
1, 000× (1− 0.06) = 6.94× 12a(12)65 for females.
The market price of risk for males and females respectively is shown in Table 3.1. The
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market price of risk is 0.1792 for male annuitants and 0.2312 for female annuitants.
Table 3.1: The market price of risk, determined by the 1996 IAM 2000 Basic Table, the US
Treasury constant maturity interest rate term structure on August 15, 1996, and annuity
market prices from Best’s Review (August 1996) net of my assumed expense factor 6 percent.
The payment rate is the dollars per month of life annuity per $1,000 of lump–sum life annuity
premium at the issue age. The market value is the price (net of annuity expenses) for $1 per
month of life annuity.
Payment Rate Market Value Market price of risk
Male (65) 7.48 125.73 0.1792
Female (65) 6.94 135.25 0.2312
3.3.2 Mortality Bond Strike Levels
A designed portfolio of annuities underlies the mortality bond. The mortality bond contract
may set several strike levels Xt. In my example, I set three different improvement levels for
male and female age 65 immediate annuities which determine the strike levels. I use the
Renshaw et al. (1996)’s method to predict the force of mortality and discuss this method in
section 3.5. The improvement levels in Table 3.2 are determined by the average of 30–year
force of mortality improvement forecast for age group 65–74, age group 75–84 and age group
85–94 respectively based on the 1963, 1973, 1983 and 1996 US individual annuity mortality
tables.
Table 3.2: Three different improvement levels determine the strike levels.
Age Range Change of Force of Mortality
65–74 -0.0070
75–84 -0.0093
85–94 -0.0103
Including the above improvement factors, the corresponding strike level for each age will
be Xt. The number of survivors `65+t is the number of lives attaining age in the survivorship
group set in the contract. This means that I set the strike levels Xt as follows:
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Xt =

`x tpx e
0.0070t for t = 1, ..., 10
`x tpx e
0.07e0.0093(t−10) for t = 11, ..., 20
`x tpx e
0.163e0.0103(t−20) for t = 21, ..., 30
where tpx is the survival probability for males or females from the 1996 IAM 2000 Basic
table.
In the annuity market, the price of an immediate annuity is the discounted expected
cash flow to a random lifetime of annuitant. The random cash flows are { 1
12
1000`x+t/12|t =
1, 2, ...}. The observed price allows me to calculate the market price of risk λ in the Wang
transform. The market price of risk λ is obtained from the following equation:
12`xa
(12)
65 =
∞∑
t=1/12
E∗[`x+t]d(0, t) (3.10)
where `xa
(12)
65 is the total immediate annuity premium net of the insurer’s expenses from a
initial number of annuitants `x and E
∗[`x+t] is the transformed expected number of survivors
to time t.
In the bond market I have cash flows {Dt} which depend on the same distribution of
survivors. I assume that investors accept the same pricing method so that the bond price is
V = Fd(0, T ) +
T∑
t=1
E∗[Dt]d(0, t) (3.11)
where Dt is defined in (3.3) and d(0, t) is the discount factor based on the risk free interest
rate term structure at the time the bond is issued. The face amount F is not at risk; it is paid
at time T regardless of the number of surviving annuitants. The discount factors are from
the US Treasury interest rate term structure on August 15, 1996. The survival distribution
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in equation (3.11) is the distribution derived from the annuity market. It is based on the
1996 US Annuity 2000 Basic Mortality Tables and equation (3.8) with λ = 0.1792 for male
annuitants and λ = 0.2312 for females.
E∗[Dt] is calculated as follows. From (3.3) we can write the coupon payment as
1
1000
Dt =

0 if `x+t > C +Xt
C +Xt − `x+t if Xt < `x+t ≤ C +Xt
C if `x+t ≤ Xt
(3.12)
= C −max(`x+t −Xt, 0) + max(`x+t −Xt − C, 0)
= C − (`x+t −Xt)+ + (`x+t −Xt − C)+ (3.13)
Therefore
1
1000
E∗[Dt] = C − E∗[(`x+t −Xt)+] + E∗[(`x+t −Xt − C)+].
The distribution of `x+t is the distribution of the number of survivors from `x who survive to
age x+t, which occurs with probability tp
∗
x where tp
∗
x is the transformed survival probability.
Therefore `x+t has a binomial with parameters `x and tp
∗
x. We have a large `x value so `x+t
has approximately a normal distribution with mean E∗[`x+t] = µ∗t = `xtp
∗
x and the variance
Var∗[`x+t] = σ∗2t = `xtp
∗
x(1− tp∗x).3 From equation (2.11), I get
E[(X − k)+] = Ψ(k) =
∫ ∞
k
[1− Φ(t)]dt
= φ(k)− k[1− Φ(k)].
This is a useful form since the functions φ(k) and Φ(k) can be calculated with Excel. Then
3The calculation is done separately for males and females although the notation does not reflect the
difference. We can easily adjust this for a mixture of males and females.
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I can calculate components of E∗(Dt):
E∗[(`x+t −Xt)+] = E∗[(`x+t − µ∗t − (Xt − µ∗t )+]
= σ∗t E
∗
[(
`x+t − µ∗t
σ∗t
− kt
)
+
]
= σ∗tΨ(kt)
where kt = (Xt − µ∗t )/σ∗t . Similarly
E∗[(`x+t −Xt − C)+] = σ∗tΨ(kt + C/σ∗t )
Finally I have the formula:
E∗[Dt] = 1000 {C − σ∗t [Ψ(kt)−Ψ(kt + C/σ∗t )]} . (3.14)
Consider an initial cohort of 10,000 annuitants all the same sex, `65 = 10, 000. Table 3.3
shows prices for mortality bonds and reinsurance for a group of 10,000 male and female
annuitants respectively with $1,000 annual payout per person, with the strike levels defined
above, the annual aggregate cash flow out of the SPC $700,000 (=1000C) and a 7 percent
coupon rate for both straight bond and mortality bond. The price of the mortality bond on
male age 65 immediate annuitants is $998.85 per $1000 of face value. Similarly, the bond
price for the female age 65 immediate annuitants is $995.57 per $1000. With the above
setup, the reinsurance price is $11,493 for male age 65 and $44,337 for female age 65. It
gives the insurer 30–year protection. If the number of survivors exceeds the strike level Xt
in year t, the SPC will pay the insurer the excess (Bt) up to $700,000 and the total coupon
the investors will get that year is max[0, 700, 000−Bt]. Compared with the total immediate
annuity premium the insurer collects from the annuitants ($99,650,768 for male age 65 and
$107,232,089 for female age 65), the reinsurance premium the insurer pays the SPC is only a
negligible proportion of the total annuity premium (0.012 percent for male and 0.041 percent
CHAPTER 3. SECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 43
Table 3.3: Mortality Bond Price and Reinsurance Premium
Male (65) Female (65)
Market price of risk (λ) 0.1792 0.2312
Number of annuitants 10,000 10,000
Annuity annual payout per person 1,000 1,000
Total premium from annuitants 99,650,768 107,232,089
Improvement level age 65 - 74 -0.0070 -0.0070
Improvement level age 75 - 84 -0.0093 -0.0093
Improvement level age 85 - 94 -0.0103 -0.0103
Face value of straight bond 10,000,000 10,000,000
Face value of mortality bond 10,000,000 10,000,000
Coupon rate of straight bond and mortality bond 0.07 0.07
Annual aggregate cash flow out of SPC (1000C) 700,000 700,000
Straight bond price 10,000,000 10,000,000
Mortality bond price 9,988,507 9,955,663
Reinsurance premium 11,493 44,337
for female).
3.4 How Good is the Hedge?
Given the distribution of survivors, there is very little variance in the cash flows. For example,
given the survivor function tpx of `x+t, we can describe `x+t as a binomial distribution. It is
the number of successes in N = `x trials with the probability of a success on a given trial of
tpx. The distribution of `x+t is approximately normal with parameters E[`x+t] = N tpx and
Var[`x+t] = N tpx(1− tpx). The coefficient of variation is the ratio of σt/µt. The graph of the
coefficient of variation of the number of survivors for an initial group of 10,000 annuitants,
based on the 1994 GAM female age 65 survival distribution is shown in Figure 3.2. Note
that for a bond of duration 30-years, the coefficient of variation rises to a maximum of about
1 percent , so there is little risk, given the table. In calculating the bond value, we have to
evaluate the expected value E(`x+t) carefully. It is not enough to estimate a mortality table
and then estimate the expected value. That approach would ignore the uncertainty in the
table.
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Figure 3.2: The ratio of standard deviation to expected number of survivors of an initial
group of 10,000 annuitants, based on the 1994 GAM female age 65 mortality distribution.
In order to illustrate this further, suppose that the possible tables are labelled with a
random variable θ. The the conditional distribution `x+t|θ depends on θ. The unconditional
moments are
E[`x+t] = E[E[`x+t|θ]] = NE[E[tpx|θ]]
Var[`x+t] = E[Var[`x+t|θ]] + Var[E[`x+t|θ]]. (3.15)
Even if, as in Figure 3.2, there is very little variance in E[`x+t|θ] for all θ and the range of
t ≤ 30, there is still variance due to table uncertainty (the second term in equation (3.15)).
I have little experience to guide me in estimating the terms E[E[tpx|θ]] and E[Var[tpx|θ]]. Of
course, this uncertainty occurs in all kinds of mortality calculation, not just mortality bonds.
I use the simulation to examine the impact of mortality shocks which shift the mortality
tables to the insurer and the investors. With the setup shown in Table 3.3, I assume that
the uncertainty υt at time t in the mortality table follows a normal distribution with mean 0
and variance 1. The distribution of mortality shocks εt at time t is a beta distribution with
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parameters a and b. The mortality improvement shock εt is expressed as a percentage of the
force of mortality µx+t, so it ranges from 0 to 1, that is, 0 < t < 1 with probability 1.
Before performing the simulation, I first examine the mean and standard deviation of the
annual percentage mortality improvement based on the US 1963, 1973, 1983 and 1996 IAM
tables for the males aged from age 65 to age 94. I conclude that its mean µm is equal to
0.0122 and the standard deviation σm is 0.0099. In the following simulation, I assume the
coefficient of variation CV in different shock scenarios is constant, that is,
CV = σm/µm = 0.0099/0.0122 = 0.8139.
Without the shock, the one-year survival probability for an age x + t with the market
expectation is p∗x+t = exp(−µ∗x+t). With the shock, the new survival probability p′x+t can be
expressed as:
p
′
x+t = (e
−µ∗x+t)1−εt = (p∗x+t)
1−εt .
The random number of survivors `
′
x+t+1 at time t + 1 is conditional on last period’s
survival number `
′
x+t, the shock parameters εt and the mortality table random parameters
υt:
`
′
x+t+1 = `
′
x+tp
′
x+t + υt
√
`
′
x+tp
′
x+t(1− p′x+t).
Table 3.4 presents the results of simulations of the number of survivors `85 at time t = 20,
the present value of annuity payments and the present value of cash flows to bondholders.
Each simulation includes a shock improvement to market mortality, modeled by multiplying
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Figure 3.3: The change in expected present values of annuity payments (solid line) and
bondholder payments (broken line) are shown as a function of the mortality shocks E[εt].
The numerical values are shown in Table 3.4.
the force of mortality by a factor 1 − t in each year. With a small mortality improvement
shock E[εt] = 0.01 (Table 3.4), that is, a = 1.49 and b = 147.51, the present value of total
annuity payments increase from 99,650,768 without shock to 101,081,752 on average. In
this scenario, investors will lose 3.43 percent [=(9,988,507 -9,646,354 )/9,988,507] of their
expected total payments. When there is a big shock E[εt] = 0.5, the present value of total
annuity payments will increase by 12.21 percent and the investors will lose 37.61 percent of
their total expected payments on average. The impact of different mortality shock is illus-
trated in Figure 3.3. The mortality bond coupons are reduced as the SPC pays reinsurance
benefits to the insurer. This hedges the insurer’s risk that the number of survivors exceeds
the market’s expected value.
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The mortality bond price and reinsurance premium are very sensitive to an insurer’s
expense rate. With a given annuity market quote and a given strike level, the net annuity
premium increases with a decrease in the expense factor and thus the market price of risk
λ increases. This implies that the market predicts a higher future survival rate tp
∗
x and
anticipates that the number of survivors is more likely to exceed the given strike level Xt.
The mortality bond price goes down because the investors are more likely to lose higher
proportion of their coupons and the reinsurance premium correspondingly goes up. The
results for an increase in the expense rate are just on the opposite. See Table 3.5.
As Edwalds (2003) notes, longevity risk could easily extend over 50 years or more. Most
long term bonds mature within 30 years. It is conceivable that a reinsurer can issue a
very long term bond (through the SPC), essentially fully collateralized with cash flows only
depending on mortality risk, which would appeal to investors. This would increase the
reinsurer’s capacity to issue long term contracts to its client companies.
Reinsurers may find annuity securitization to be an efficient means of increasing capacity
despite transaction costs, simply because reinsurers must hold more capital to write the
same risk. With greater capacity, better contracting terms (longer terms, for example) and
potentially lower cost (more efficient use of capital), securitization may be a feasible tool for
reinsurer to hedge its mortality risks.
For investors, the risk of losing a large proportion of annual coupon is relatively low (e.g.
in my setup), even if for a big mortality improvement shock. The mortality bond may be a
good candidate for the investors to diversify their investment portfolio.
3.5 Difficulties in Accurate Mortality Projection
General and insured population mortality has improved remarkably over the last several
decades. For example, the force of mortality for male age 65 decreases from 0.0222 based on
the US 1963 IAM Table to 0.0111 based on the US 1996 IAM Table. At old age probabilities
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Table 3.4: Simulation results for mortality shocks of 1%, 5%, 10%, 25% and 50% improve-
ments in excess of market expectation (10,000 trials).
Present Value Percentage Change
l85 Annuity
Payments
Coupons
and Princi-
pal
Annuity
Payments
Coupons
and Princi-
pal
Shock parameters: a = 1.49, b = 147.51, E[εt] = 0.01, σ[εt] = 0.0081
Mean 5,882 101,081,752 9,646,354 1.44% -3.43%
Maximum 6,061 102,034,832 9,733,716 2.39% -2.55%
95th percentile 5,934 101,356,632 9,724,704 1.71% -2.64%
5th percentile 5,854 100,930,352 9,494,340 1.28% -4.95%
Minimum 5,850 100,910,696 9,022,497 1.26% -9.67%
Standard deviation 26 138,312 76,634
Shock parameters: a = 1.38, b = 26.30, E[εt] = 0.05, σ[εt] = 0.0407
Mean 6,014 101,784,128 9,166,880 2.14% -8.23%
Maximum 6,906 106,551,160 9,733,260 6.92% -2.56%
95th percentile 6,282 103,214,240 9,691,183 3.58% -2.98%
5th percentile 5,867 100,998,600 7,989,176 1.35% -20.02%
Minimum 5,850 100,911,688 6,277,006 1.27% -37.16%
Standard deviation 135 720,514 538,599
Shock parameters: a = 1.26, b = 11.37, E[εt] = 0.10, σ[εt] = 0.0814
Mean 6,187 102,709,848 8,521,295 3.07% -14.69%
Maximum 7,933 112,101,464 9,733,680 12.49% -2.55%
95th percentile 6,754 105,734,760 9,653,101 6.11% -3.36%
5th percentile 5,881 101,073,520 6,599,827 1.43% -33.93%
Minimum 5,850 100,910,768 4,901,722 1.26% -50.93%
Standard deviation 285 1,522,121 995,280
Shock parameters: a = 0.88, b = 2.65, E[εt] = 0.25, σ[εt] = 0.2035
Mean 6,753 105,752,992 7,192,883 6.12% -27.99%
Maximum 9,954 123,485,544 9,733,768 23.92% -2.55%
95th percentile 8,372 114,514,088 9,624,507 14.92% -3.64%
5th percentile 5,891 101,128,584 4,562,061 1.48% -54.33%
Minimum 5,850 100,910,584 3,818,042 1.26% -61.78%
Standard deviation 790 4,266,107 1,668,137
Shock parameters: a = 0.25, b = 0.25, E[εt] = 0.50, σ[εt] = 0.4070
Mean 7,847 111,815,112 6,232,152 12.21% -37.61%
Maximum 10,005 123,776,936 9,733,797 24.21% -2.55%
95th percentile 10,003 123,768,536 9,733,007 24.20% -2.56%
5th percentile 5,850 100,912,208 3,808,961 1.27% -61.87%
Minimum 5,850 100,910,520 3,808,223 1.26% -61.87%
Standard deviation 1,696 9,326,669 2,436,069
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Table 3.5: The sensitivity of mortality bond price and reinsurance premium to the change
of an insurer’s expense rate
Male Female
Expense
Factor
Mortality
Bond Price
Reinsurance
Premium
Mortality
Bond Price
Reinsurance
Premium
4% 9,316,726 683,274 9,279,932 720,068
6% 9,988,507 11,493 9,955,663 44,337
8% 10,000,000 0 10,000,000 0
of death are decreasing, increasing the need for living benefits. The calculation of expected
present values (needed in pricing and reserving) requires an appropriate mortality projection
in order to avoid underestimation or overestimation of future costs which will jeopardize an
insurer’s profit or its market share.
Rogers (2002) shows that mortality operates within a complex framework and is in-
fluenced by socioeconomic factors, biological variables, government policies, environmental
influences, health conditions and health behaviors. Not all of these factors improve with time.
For example, for biological variables, recent declines in mortality rates were not distributed
evenly over the disease categories of underlying and multiple causes of death. According to
Stallard (2002), successes against the top three killers (heart diseases, cerebrovascular dis-
eases and malignant neoplasms) did not translate into successes against many of the lower
ranked diseases. Moreover, Olshansky (2004) points out, a projected “quantum leap” in
mortality depends on new biomedical technologies, administered to enough people to have
an impact on the population. This may be difficult to do, even if these were a technological
breakthrough.
3.5.1 Different Opinions on Mortality Trend
Improvement
Buettner (2002) concludes that there are today two alternative views about the future im-
provement of mortality at older ages: compression vs. expansion (sometimes also called
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 Figure 3.4: Two views of mortality improvement, rectangularization on the left and steady
progress on the right.
rectangularization vs. steady progress), illustrated in Figure 3.4. Mortality compression
occurs when age-specific mortality declines over a widening range of adult ages, but meets
natural limits for very advanced ages. As a result, the survivor curve would approach a
rectangle and mortality across countries may indeed converge to similar patterns.
In the case of steady progress, there are no natural limits to further reductions in mortality
at higher ages. The age at which natural limits set in does not exist. Consequently, all age
groups, especially higher age groups, would continue to experience declining mortality. The
Human Genome Project is producing a rapidly expanding base of knowledge about life
processes at their most fundamental level. Some experts have predicted that the genes for
the aging process will be identified and drugs to retard the aging process will be developed
in the not distant future. It is worth noting that genetic technology, including the mapping
of the human genome, has developed much faster than forecasts. Anti–aging drugs may be
available sooner than anyone forecasts.
Life Table Entropy
Life table entropy refers to a phenomenon that further improvement of already high life
expectancies may become increasingly more difficult. The gains in survival a century ago
were greater than they have been more recently. For instance, Rogers (2002) shows that
the survival gains achieved between 1900 and 1920 are large compared to the modest gains
realized between 1980 and 1999. Hayflick (2002) suggests that,
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. . . Those who predict enormous gains in life expectation in the future based only
on mathematically sound predictions of life table data but ignore the biological
facts that underlie longevity determination and aging do so at their own peril
and the peril of those who make health policy for the future of this country.
Deterioration
Although general population mortality has improved over time, the improvement may be
overstated. Substantial mortality improvements often come after periods of mortality de-
terioration. For example, between 1970 and 1975, males aged 30-35 saw annual mortality
improvement of over 2 percent, but this may be an adjustment to the 1.5 percent annual
mortality decline that occurred during the previous five-year period. Moreover there is still
a chance for a resurgence of infectious diseases, such as the 1918 worldwide flu.
Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 and 3.104 show the impact of 1918 world-wide flu on the
population mortality in the United States, France and Switzerland. The horizontal axis in
Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 stands for the age and the vertical axis is the force
of mortality. Each graph except the last one in each figure shows the mortality experience
in one particular year and is ordered according to time. The last shows all of the preceding
graphes together. There is an obvious spike around year 1918 for all these three countries.
The 1918 flu pushed up the mortality rates dramatically. However, the force of mortality
went back to normal afterward. Similar epidemics in the future may strike life insurance
industry hard since the financial capacity of the life insurance industry to pay catastrophic
death losses is limited.
Moreover, deaths due to influenza could increase with the introduction of new influenza
strains or with shortages of the influenza vaccine. Rogers (2002) argues that although HIV is
now controlled, it is not eradicated and could expand, or variants of HIV could develop that
4Source: Human Mortality Database. University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute
for Demographic Research (Germany). Available at www.mortality.org or www.humanmortality.de (Data
downloaded November 1 – 10, 2004).
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Figure 3.5: 1916–1920 US Female Population qx.
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Figure 3.6: 1916–1920 US Male Population qx.
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Figure 3.7: 1913–1920 France Female Population qx.
CHAPTER 3. SECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 53
1913 - 1920 France Male
20 30 40 50 60
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.09
20 30 40 50 60
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.09
20 30 40 50 60
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.09
All Together
20 30 40 50 60
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.09
20 30 40 50 60
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.09
20 30 40 50 60
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.09
20 30 40 50 60
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.09
20 30 40 50 60
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.09
20 30 40 50 60
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.09
Figure 3.8: 1913–1920 France Male Population qx.
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Figure 3.9: 1916–1920 Switzerland Female Population qx.
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Figure 3.10: 1916–1920 Switzerland Male Population qx.
CHAPTER 3. SECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 54
Table 3.6: December 2004 Earthquake and Tsunami Death Toll and Percentage Excess Death
Rates by Country
Country Confirmed deathsa Missinga % Excess Death Rateb
Indonesia 127,420 116,368 16.58%
Sri Lanka 38,195 4,924 33.81%
India 10,779 5,614 0.18%
Thailand 5,395 2,991 1.90%
Somalia 298 - 0.21%
Myanmar 90 - -
Maldives 82 - 3.25%
Malaysia 68 - 0.06%
Tanzania 10 - -
Bangladesh 2 - -
Kenya 1 - -
Total 182,340 129,897 -
aSource: Associated Press
bBased on the authors’ calculation. The percentage excess death rate is equal to the excess death rate from
tsunami and missing divided by the normal population death rate.
The normal population death rate is obtained from education.yahoo.com.
could increase mortality. Drug resistant infectious diseases like tuberculosis could increase.
Goss et al. (1998) find that age–adjusted annual death rates for ages 85 and over in the
United States actually deteriorated by 0.72 percent per year for males and by 0.52 percent
for females during the observation period 1990-94.
In addition, catastrophe death losses from natural disasters should not be ignored. A
more recent example of unanticipated catastrophe death losses is the December 26, 2004
earthquake and tsunami. It caused massive devastation across southern Asia and eastern
Africa (Guy Carpenter, 2005). The earthquake damage in Indonesia was obscured by the
subsequent tsunami that hit 15–20 minutes later. The death and missing count has now
exceeded 300,000 (Table 3.6). The last column in Table 3.6 shows that the 2004 Indonesian
population death index increased by 16.58 percent relative to the 2003 level. The excess
population mortality death rate is even higher for Sri Lanka, about 34 percent. It raises
a realistic question for life insurers, “Are you well prepared to handle such disasters in the
future”?
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In sum, there is no agreement among experts on the future of mortality. Steady improve-
ment is the trend, but changes in either direction are feasible.
3.5.2 Technical Difficulties in Mortality Projections
Quality of Data
Good quality, complete data are prerequisites for reliable mortality projections. However,
in reality, it is not easy to obtain data for research. For example, although detailed data
on old-age mortality are collected in most countries of the developed world, they are not so
commonly available for developing countries. Buettner (2002) claims that even in developed
countries, the quality of age reporting deteriorates among the very old.
The Society of Actuaries’ series of studies of life annuity experience is of limited value
for several reasons. First, it is not timely. Second, it is appropriate only for the products
the policy holders owned (whole life, term life, or annuities, for example). So it cannot be
used directly to assess mortality for new products or similar products issued on a new basis
(e.g., underwriting annuities for select mortality).
Thulin et al. (2002) note that complexity of annuity products nowadays often makes
mortality projection difficult. Sometimes, an insurer has to introduce new entries with
different mortality assumptions into the insured pool. For instance, trends in the marketplace
are blurring traditional distinctions in the following two key areas:
(1) Work site products sold on an individual basis increasingly show features traditionally
associated with group products.
(2) Group products sold on the basis of individual election in the workplace (voluntary prod-
ucts) with minimal participation requirements compete directly with individual prod-
ucts.
They severely limit insurers’ ability to underwrite to discern mortality differentials. New
sources of underwriting information are becoming a way of life for insurers, as pressure on
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costs and hastened issue pressure create an underwriting environment with less documenta-
tion and information. One solution is making more data available to researchers and making
it available sooner.
The Society of Actuaries publishes tables and mortality reports from time to time. The
individual annuity mortality (IAM) tables are intended for estimation of insurance company
liabilities and these tables are based on actual insurance industry experience. I use the
projected IAM tables to determine the strike levels for my annuity mortality bond in section
3.3.
The Society also published periodic group annuity mortality reports of actual experience.
While the reports do not contain complete mortality tables, they are not adjusted and not as
conservative as the IAM tables. Moreover, the experience reports were made more frequently
than the IAM tables were constructed. In this section, I use the group annuity mortality
tables for the illustration and prediction of future mortality trends although the same skill
can be applied on the individual annuity mortality tables.
The GAM Experience Reports (Committee on Annuities, 1952, 1962, 1975, 1983, 1984,
1987, 1990, 1994, 1996) describe the mortality improvement from 1951–1992. The Reports
give the number of deaths observed among a cohort of annuitants in 5–year age groups
observed for one year. The observations of deaths and exposures are summarized in the
appendix to this paper. The Reports provide data, but do not construct mortality tables. I
show graphs of this experience in Figures 3.11. For male and female data, the survival curves
generally rise with the observation period. The change between 1981 and 1991 for females
is an exception since there is some deterioration at the later ages. That is, the lowest line
at each age are for the 1951 observations, the next to lowest are for 1961, and so on. The
trend in improvement is increasing on average, with the largest increase occurring between
1971 and 1981 for males and females.
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Figure 3.11: Number of survivors (vertical axis) of an initial cohort of 1,000 male (left)
and female lives at age 55, based on the Society of Actuaries TSA Reports for 1951, 1961,
1971, 1981, and 1991 on group annuity experience, without adjustments. The horizontal
axis stands for age.
Projection Models
Recent changes in mortality challenge mortality projection models. The competitive nature
of the insurance market means that an insurer cannot raise its price at will. A sound
projection model is crucial. However, the revealed weakness and problems of poor fitting
may arise because most projection models do not capture the dynamics of mortality that is
changing in a dramatic and fundamental way.
Renshaw et al. (1996) suggest a generalized linear model that showed mortality declining
over time with the rates of decline not being necessarily uniform across the age range. It
incorporates both the age variation in morality and the underlying trends in the mortality
rates. The advantage of this model is that the predictions of future forces of mortality come
directly from the model formula. I adopt this model for investigating the performance of
mortality derivatives based on a portfolio of life annuities.
During a certain period, the force of mortality, µ(x, t), at age x, in calendar year t, is
modeled using the following formula:
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µ(x, t) = exp
[
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γijLj(x
′)
)
t′i
}
(3.16)
where
t′ =
t− 1971.5
20.5
and x′ =
x− 74.5
17.5
.
Sithole et al. (2000) use the same model. They note that first factor in (3.16) is the
equivalent of a Gompertz-Makeham graduation term. The second multiplicative term is an
adjustment term to predict an age-specific trend. The γij terms may be pre-set to 0. The age
and time variables are rescaled to x′ and t′ so that both are mapped onto the interval [−1,+1]
after transforming ages and calendar years. Lj(x) is the Legendre polynomial defined below:
L0(x) = 1
L1(x) = x
L2(x) = (3x
2 − 1)/2
L3(x) = (5x
3 − 3x)/2
...
(n+ 1)Ln+1(x) = (2n+ 1)xLn(x)− nLn−1(x)
where n is a positive integer and −1 ≤ x ≤ 1.
The data are the actual group annuity mortality experience for calendar years t =
1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, . . . , 1992. Since the GAM Experience Reports are five-year age group
results, I assume that the ratio of the total number of deaths in each group over the total
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number of exposures in that group (the average death rate in that group) represents the
death rate of the middle-point age of that group. I use the middle-point age as my observa-
tion in the regression. The experience was analyzed for the middle-point age ranges x = 57
to 92 years for both male and female, giving a total of 120 data cells for males and 120 for
females.
In fitting the equation (3.16), I find that when the parameter γ1,2 is excluded from
the formula (for male and female), all of the remaining six parameters in the model are
statistically significant. Although the six–parameter model which excludes the quadratic
coefficient in age effects from the trend adjustment term was next fitted to the data, the
revised models seem to be appropriate for making predictions of future forces of mortality.
µ(x, t) =
exp [β0 + β1L1(x
′) + β2L2(x′) + β3L3(x′) + α1t′ + γ11L1(x′)t′] (3.17)
Details of the revised fit are given in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Group annuities, 6-parameter log-link model. All of the coefficients are significant
at the 1% level.
Male Female
Coefficient Estimate Std. Errora Estimate Std. Errora
β0 -2.7744 0.0087 -3.3375 0.0111
β1 1.3991 0.0139 1.7028 0.0179
β2 0.1053 0.0114 0.1543 0.0146
β3 -0.1073 0.0127 -0.0872 0.0163
α1 -0.2719 0.0116 -0.2660 0.0149
γ1,1 0.0839 0.0178 -0.1294 0.0228
Adjusted R2 0.9944 0.9930
Note: aStandard Error.
Figure 3.12 shows the male group annuity predicted forces of mortality based on the 6–
parameter model given by equation (3.17). All of the predicted forces of mortality progress
smoothly with respect to both age and time. There are errors in the estimate which should
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tell us how confident we can be in projecting mortality into the future, assuming the dynamics
of mortality improvement continues as it has in the observation period. This is potentially
dangerous. As I have pointed out earlier, there is a good bit of controversy with regard to
the dynamics of mortality improvement.
I note also that these results are based on group annuity experience. Individual annuity
experience may be very different. For example, adverse selection should be a much more
important issue. As the market for individual immediate annuities develops, insurers will
have to adjust their estimates to reflect the change in the market mortality. They may
have to apply underwriting techniques and control for moral hazard and adverse selection
when they issue annuities, just as they now do for life insurance. Since individual annuity
mortality tables are more likely to capture the information asymmetry, in section 3.3 I use
the projection based on individual annuity mortality tables to determine different mortality
improvement levels for different age groups specified in the mortality bond contract.
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Figure 3.12: Male group annuity predicted forces of mortality based on 6-parameter log-link
model and TSA Reports 1951 - 1992. The top curve is the force of mortality for age 85, the
one just below it is for age 80, then 75, 70 and the bottom curve is for age 65. The greatest
improvement (steepest slope) is at age 85.
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3.6 Conclusions and Discussion
Financial innovation has led to the creation of new classes of securities that provide op-
portunities for insurers to manage their underwriting and to price risks more efficiently.
Cummins and Lewis (2002) establish that risk expansion helps to explain the development
of catastrophic risk bonds and options in the 1990s. A similar expansion is needed to man-
age longevity risk. There is a growing demand for a long term hedge against improving
annuity mortality. I have shown how innovation in swaps and bond contracts can provide
new securities which can provide the hedge insurers need.
There is a trend of privatizing social security systems with insurers taking more longevity
risk. Moreover, the trend to defined contribution corporate pension plans is increasing the
potential demand for immediate annuities. This is an opportunity and also a challenge
to insurers. Insurers will need increased capacity to take on longevity risks and securities
markets can provide it. This will allow annuity insurers to share this “big cake.” Securiti-
zation of mortality risks has long duration, high capacity and possibly low cost. Demand
for new securities arises when new risks appear and when existing risks become more signif-
icant in magnitude. And we now have the technology to securitize the mortality risks based
on modern financial models. Securitization in the annuity and life insurance markets has
been relatively rare, but I have argued that this may change. I explore the securitization of
mortality risks showing how it can help solve the difficulties in managing annuity mortality
risks.
4
Mortality Securitization Modeling
As a step toward understanding mortality securities, I develop an asset pricing model for
mortality-based securities in an incomplete market framework with jump processes. My
model nicely explains opposite market outcomes of two existing pure mortality securities.
4.1 Introduction
The first pure death-risk linked deal was the three-year Swiss Re bond issued in December
2003 (Swiss Re, 2003; MorganStanley, 2003; The Actuary, 2004). Almost one year later,
the European Investment Bank (EIB) issued the first pure longevity-risk linked deal— a
25-year 540 million-pound (775 million-euro) bond as part of a product designed by the
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BNP Paribas aimed at protecting UK pension schemes against longevity risk.1 In 2005, the
Swiss Re Company issued two more mortality bonds. The Swiss Re deal is a hedge against
catastrophic loss of insured lives that might result from natural or man-made disasters in
the US or Europe. The EIB deal is a security to transfer the other tail of mortality risk,
longevity risk, to the capital market.
Interestingly, the market outcomes of the first two mortality bonds are opposite. Accord-
ing to MorganStanley, “the appetite for this security [the Swiss Re bonds] from investors
was strong.” This is the same reaction investors have had to the so–called catastrophe bonds
based on portfolios of property insurance. The strong appetite for mortality securities may
indicate a growing potential market for mortality securities (Lin and Cox, 2005). On the
other hand, the EIB bond has not sold very well at all.
It is important to understand why investors viewed the Swiss Re bond price favorably,
yet did not buy the EIB bond. To evaluate these two bonds, we need a model that can
capture and price mortality risks. I notice there are only a few preliminary papers in this
area. Developing asset pricing theory in this area is important as it will help market par-
ticipants better understand these new financial instruments. Most of the existing mortality
securitization pricing papers have two major shortcomings: first, they ignore mortality jumps
(Lee and Carter, 1992; Lee, 2000; Renshaw et al., 1996; Sithole et al., 2000; Milevsky and
Promislow, 2001; Olivieri and Pitacco, 2002; Dahl, 2003; Cairns et al., 2006). Mortality
jumps should not be ignored in mortality securitization modeling since the rationale behind
selling or buying mortality securities is to hedge or take catastrophe mortality risks (i.e., too
many people die); second, they use complete market pricing methodology. I doubt that pure
mortality risk bonds can be replicated with traded securities. Therefore, I propose to price
mortality bonds in an incomplete market framework with the jump processes and the Wang
transform.
My idea is to derive the two-factor Wang transform parameters from insurance markets
1From www.IPE.com on November 8, 2004.
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then use the same parameters for mortality-linked security pricing. I also use a jump model
for mortality dynamics. My model enables investors to better understand why the Swiss
Re deal is an attractive investment despite the uncertainty associated with catastrophic
mortality risks while the EIB bond has not sold very well.
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 4.2 I highlight some shocks in the mortality
evolution. Section 4.3 describes the current mortality securitization market and the designs
of the first two mortality bonds — the Swiss Re and EIB bonds. The two-factor Wang
transform as an incomplete market pricing method is introduced in Section 4.4. In Section
4.5, I propose a mortality stochastic model with jumps and price the Swiss Re and EIB
bonds. I show that the jump process plays an important role in mortality securitization
modeling. Moreover, my model nicely explains the opposite market outcomes of these two
bonds. Section 4.6 is a final discussion and conclusion.
4.2 Mortality Shocks
Mortality operates within a complex framework and is influenced by socioeconomic factors,
biological variables, government policies, environmental influences, health conditions and
health behaviors (Rogers, 2002). As no one can accurately predict mortality dynamics,
unexpected mortality shocks can devastate the insurance pooling mechanism. In the case
of life insurance, the “bad” risk is that the lives insured die sooner than forecast when
the policies were issued (I call it “bad shock”). Examples of bad shocks, such as the 1918
worldwide flu and the 2004 earthquake and tsunami, are shown in Section 3.5.1. For an
annuity portfolio, the “bad” risk is that the annuitants will live longer than expected when
the annuities were issued (I call it “good shock”).
Both kinds of mortality changes reflect the dynamics of the underlying table. Unantici-
pated changes might be shocks like a pandemic flu. It could also be a more gradual, but still
unanticipated dynamic. For example, mortality gradually improved in the twentieth century
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as cities began to provide sanitary sewers and clean water. Technological changes, such as
development of vaccines and antibiotics also improved longevity. Insurers and pension plans
are keenly interested in understanding the future course of mortality, as well as the protec-
tion provided by hedging, asset allocation strategies, reinsurance, and securitization. Among
these risk management tools, mortality securitization is a fairly new tool which should gain
more attention.
4.3 Mortality Securitization Markets
Lane and Beckwith (2005) describe recent activity in the insurance securitization market.
Over the past ten years, insurance and capital market are converging. Capital market
investors search for uncorrelated risk for diversification and the risk–adjusted excess return
“α”. Insurance-linked securities have low or no correlation with financial markets, providing
diversification. Moreover, the existing insurance-linked securities provide high risk-adjusted
excess return. They attract more and more investors. For example, hedge funds increased
their investment in insurance–linked securities. At the same time, insurers are looking for
new sources of risk financing in the capital markets.
Table 4.1 shows all of the property and life insurance securitization issuances in dollar
terms and by number of transactions through March 2005. In general, insurance securiti-
zation increased in both dollar amounts and the number of issues especially in the last two
years. The life securitization includes three “pure” mortality bonds in the US and one in the
Europe since December 2003. The first two publicly known pure mortality securities are the
Swiss Re bond issued in December 2003 (Swiss Re, 2003; MorganStanley, 2003; The Actu-
ary, 2004) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) longevity risk bond issued in November
2004.
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Table 4.1: Property and Life Insurance Securitization Issuance
Period Issuance in Millions Number of Deals
Pre 3/1998 $886.1 7
4/1998 – 3/1999 $1,366.9 7
4/1999 – 3/2000 $1,219.4 11
4/2000 – 3/2001 $1,126.0 10
4/2001 – 3/2002 $826.9 6
4/2002 – 3/2003 $832.20 25
4/2003 – 3/2004 $1,894.60 27
4/2004 – 3/2005 $1,803.30 21
Source: Lane Financial L.L.C., April, 2005.
4.3.1 Design of the Swiss Re Bond
The financial capacity of the life insurance industry to pay catastrophic death losses from
hurricanes, epidemics, earthquakes, and other natural or man-made disasters is limited. To
expand its capacity to pay catastrophic mortality losses, the Swiss Reinsurance Company,
the world’s second–largest reinsurance company, obtained $400 million in coverage from
institutional investors after its first pure mortality security. Swiss Re issued the bond in
late December 2003. It matures on January 1, 2007. So it is a three-year deal. The
principal is exposed to mortality risk. The mortality risk is defined in terms of an index
q based on the weighted average annual population death rates in the US, UK, France,
Italy and Switzerland. If the index q exceeds 130 percent of the actual 2002 level, q0, then
the investors will have a reduced principal payment. The following equation describes the
principal repayment mathematically.
Maturity value =

400, 000, 000 if q ≤ 1.3q0
400, 000, 000
1.5q0 − q
0.2q0
if 1.3q0 < q ≤ 1.5q0.
0 if q > 1.5q0
where q = weighted average population mortality in the US, UK, France, Italy, and Switzer-
land. q0 = Year 2002 level, qi = Year (2002 + i) level, and q = max(q1, q2, q3).
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If the maturity value of the Swiss Re deal were based on the Sri Lanka’s population index,
the excess death rate 33.81 percent caused by the earthquake and tsunami in 2004 (Table
3.6) would exceed the trigger level 30 percent. Then the maturity value would be lower than
the face value.
4.3.2 Design of the EIB Longevity Bond
About one year after the Swiss Re bond issue, in November 2004, the EIB issued a longevity
bond to provide a solution for financial institutions looking for instruments to hedge their
long-term systematic longevity risks. This bond is the result of the co-operation between the
BNP Paribas as structurer/manager, the European Investment Bank (EIB) as issuer and the
PartnerRe as the provider of analysis, expertise and risk taking capacity. The total value of
the issue was £540 million (775 million-euro). It was primarily intended for purchase by UK
pension plans (Cairns et al., 2005). The term of the EIB bond is 25 years. Potential buyers
of the EIB bond are pension plans, as the bond transfers longevity risks to investors.
Here is how the EIB bond works: The bond’s cash flows will be based on the actual
longevity experience of the English and Welsh male population aged 65 years old, as pub-
lished annually by the Office for National Statistics. The future cash flows of the bond will
be equal to the amount of a fixed annuity, £50 million, multiplied by the percentage of the
reference population still alive at each anniversary. The cash flows, therefore, decline over
time. Figure 4.1 shows projected coupons (payable annually) based on the projected survival
rates produced by the UK Government Actuary’s Department (GAD).
4.4 Incomplete Market Pricing Method—Two-Factor
Wang Transform
Pricing derivative securities in complete markets involves replicating portfolios. For example,
if we have a traded bond and stock index, then options on the stock index can be replicated
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Figure 4.1: Projected coupons of the EIB longevity bond. The vertical axis shows projected
cash flows (millions in pounds) and time is on the horizontal axis.
by holding bonds and the index, which are priced. The analogy for the Swiss Re bond does
not work. The bond is a mortality derivative, but we have no efficiently traded mortality
index with which to create a replicating hedge. Situations like this are called incomplete
markets. Pricing in this situation must rely on some other assumption — there is no traded
underlying security.
In my application, I use the observed prices of life insurance and annuities in the retail
market to derive those parameters by using the two-factor Wang transform. Then I use the
same model to price mortality securities.
4.4.1 Two-Factor Wang Transform
The one-factor Wang transform in equation (2.5) assumes that the true distribution is known.
However, in reality, we can at best estimate the parameters of a probability density function
by a sample out of the population. The two-factor Wang transform allows for parameter
uncertainty:
F ∗X(x) = Q[Φ
−1(FX(x)) + λ] (4.1)
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where Q is the t-distribution. As in the one-factor model in equation (2.5), the discounted
expected value under the transformed distribution F ∗X(x) in equation (4.1) is the price of X.
Suppose an insurer transfers its longevity risk to the financial market by issuing a
longevity bond. We can derive the market price of risk λ based on the annuity retail market,
then use the same λ to price the longevity bond. If there are no transaction costs between the
insurance market and the financial market and annuities were actually traded, my method
guarantees no arbitrage opportunity between these two markets. There is another way to
view this. Insurers price these life and annuity obligations using a distribution (usually pri-
vately held) of future life time. I get to observe the insurers’ prices and use an industry
market distribution (known to all) F (x). From the prices, I am able to derive the market
price of risk λ so that the observed retail life insurance or annuity prices are discounted ex-
pected values using F ∗(x). Then I transfer the same λ to the bond market and use the F ∗(x)
to price mortality-linked bonds. As a result, the insurer uses the same mortality assumptions
to price the mortality bond as it uses in pricing retail life insurance or annuities.
4.4.2 Why Transform?
According to the classical CAPM with the complete market assumption, the risk premium
of an asset should be zero if its payoffs are uncorrelated with those of the market portfolio.
Insurance market is an incomplete market which violates the complete market assumption
in the CAPM. Therefore, the CAPM cannot explain positive and very high risk premium of
insurance-linked securities whose risk has no or low correlation with that of financial mar-
kets. By maximizing the ex post value of the firm, Froot and O’Connel (1997), Froot and
Stein (1998) and Froot (2003) suggest that high risk premium of insurance-linked securi-
ties or reinsurance reflects risk aversion of insurers or investors when they face unhedgeable
insurance risks. Risk aversion of the insurers may arise from the fact that the true eco-
nomic capital requirements of insurance/reinsurance business are not straightforward and
potential financial distress costs are very high (Minton et al., 2004). On the other hand,
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risk aversion of investors may arise from their loss aversion and/or default risk, potential
moral hazard behavior and basis risk of the insurance-linked security issuing firm (Doherty,
1997). Consistent with the theories of Froot and O’Connel (1997), Froot (2003) and Doherty
(1997), the transformed distribution in the Wang transform reflects risk aversion of insurers
and investors to unhedgeable risks. In Section 4.5, I show that the transformed mortality
distribution has a longer tail (i.e. higher probability of having catastrophes) than the phys-
ical distribution. Evidently insurers and investors are risk averse to catastrophic mortality
events.
4.4.3 Estimation
I show how to estimate the market price of risk of longevity based on the two-factor Wang
transform. Suppose an annuity insurer sells the single premium immediate annuities (SPIA)
on lives age 65 in 1996.
I define my transformed distribution F ∗ as:
F ∗(tq65) = tq∗65 = Q[Φ
−1(tq65)− λ] (4.2)
where tq65 is the probability that a person aged 65 dies before age 65 + t. To calculate the
values of tq65 for male and female aged 65, I use the same data, expenses assumption (i.e. 6
percent) and equation (3.9) as those in Section 3.3.1.
The market prices of risk for males and females by applying the two-factor Wang trans-
form equation (4.2) respectively are shown in Table 4.2. The market price of risk is 0.2318
for male annuitants and 0.3286 for female annuitants which is higher than those (i.e. 0.1792
for male and 0.2312 for female) in Table 3.1 when I use the one-factor Wang transform. It
implies higher required risk premiums due to parameter uncertainty.
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Table 4.2: The market price of risk by applying the two-factor Wang transform, determined
by the 1996 IAM 2000 Basic Table, the US Treasury interest rate term structure on August
15, 1996, and the annuity market prices from Kiczek (1996). The single premium is the
lump-sum life annuity premium at the issue age 65. The payment rate is the dollars per
month of life annuity per $1,000 single premium.
Single Premium Monthly Payment Rate Market price of risk λ
Male (65) $1,000 $7.48 0.2318
Female (65) $1,000 $6.94 0.3286
4.5 Mortality Securitization Modeling
Mortality securitization modeling depends on two indispensable parts: (1) mortality fore-
casting theory and (2) incomplete market pricing theory. First, the principal or coupons of
a mortality security are determined by future mortality levels. For example, the principal
of the Swiss Re bond will be reduced if the future population mortality index increases by
more than 30 percent relative to the 2002 level. Therefore I need a model to describe future
mortality stochastic processes. Second, the insurance market is an incomplete market. If I
transfer insurance risks to the financial market by selling insurance-linked securities, I should
use an incomplete market pricing method to price these securities.
4.5.1 Existing Mortality Securitization Modeling
Existing mortality forecasting literature
Mortality securitization modeling is based on the analysis of future mortality dynamic
processes. The mortality dynamics include normal deviations from the trend and unan-
ticipated mortality shocks. Since the rationale behind selling or buying mortality securities
is to hedge or take catastrophe mortality risks, a good mortality stochastic model should
take into account mortality jumps – which might be caused by epidemics, wars, or natural
catastrophes such as tsunamis.
Most mortality forecasting papers do not explicitly model mortality jumps when they
describe future mortality stochastic processes. Dahl (2003) and Milevsky and Promislow
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(2001) model the force of mortality as an Itoˆ–type stochastic process. Therefore, they are
the models with continuous time and continuous sample paths. Cairns et al. (2006) apply
the pricing framework of positive interest rate model (Flesaker and Hughston, 1996; Rogers,
1997; Cairns, 2004) in their mortality model to get positive survival probabilities. However,
they do not show how to estimate their model. This is also a continuous time model with
continuous sample paths. Econometric methods, like the Renshaw’s method (Renshaw et al.,
1996; Sithole et al., 2000) and the Lee-Carter model (Lee and Carter, 1992; Lee, 2000), also do
not explicitly take into account mortality jumps when they model future mortality dynamics.
To improve the existing mortality securitization modeling, I propose and estimate a mortality
securitization model with jumps.
Existing mortality security pricing literature
There are only a few asset pricing papers in mortality securitization. Cairns et al. (2006)
price mortality securities with the risk-neutral measure. I propose to use an incomplete
market pricing technique (the Wang transform) to price mortality securities.
4.5.2 Model
Most of the existing mortality securities (e.g. the Swiss Re bond) link their payoffs to the
population mortality index since the population index is more transparent. Therefore, the
following discussion shows how to describe the dynamics of the US population mortality
index based on my model although my method can be also applied in other situations.
Model
Biffis (2005) addresses the risk analysis and market valuation of life insurance contracts in a
jump-diffusion setup. My approach combines a Brownian motion and a compound Poisson
process. The probability of a jump (e.g. a big change in mortality) occurring during a time
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interval of (t, t+ h) (where h is as small as you like) can be written as:
Pr[No event occurs in (t, t+ h)] = 1− Λh+ o(h) (4.3)
Pr[One event occurs in (t, t+ h)] = Λh+ o(h)
Pr[More than one event occurs in (t, t+ h)] = o(h),
where Λ is the mean number of arrivals per unit time, where o(h)/h tends to 0 as h tends to
0. Nt represents the total number of jumps a time interval of (0, t). The stochastic process
Nt and the standard Brownian motion Wt (described below) are independent.
I describes the US population mortality index qt dynamics at time t as the combination
of a Brownian motion and a compound Poisson process as follows:
dqt
qt
=

(α− Λk) dt+ σ dWt, if the Poisson event does not occur at time t;
(α− Λk) dt+ σ dWt + (Y − 1), if the Poisson event occurs at time t.
(4.4)
where α is the instantaneous expected force of the US population mortality index; σ is the
instantaneous volatility of the mortality index, conditional on no jumps. Wt is a standard
Brownian motion with mean 0 and variance t.
The quantity (Y − 1) is an impulse function producing a finite jump in qt to qtY . I can
get k ≡ E(Y − 1) where E(Y − 1) is the expected percentage change in the mortality index
if a Poisson event occurs.
The “σdWt” part describes the instantaneous part of the unanticipated “normal” mortal-
ity index change, and the “Y − 1” part describes the part due to the “abnormal” mortality
shocks. If Λ = 0, then Y − 1 = 0. And it is the same as the standard stochastic model
without jumps.
The mortality index, qt, will be continuous most of the time with finite jumps of differing
signs and amplitudes occurring at discrete points of time. If α, Λ, k, and σ are constants, I
can solve the differential equation (4.4) as
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qt
q0
= exp
[
(α− 1
2
σ2 − Λk)t+ σWt
]
Y (Nt), (4.5)
where Nt is the total number of mortality jumps with parameter Λt during a time interval
of length t. And it follows the independent Poisson process described in equation (4.3). The
cumulative jump size Y (Nt) = 1 if Nt = 0 and Y (Nt) =
∏Nt
j=1 Yj for Nt ≥ 1 where the size
of the jth jump, Yj, is independently and identically distributed.
From equation (4.5), I can derive the index value qt+h, given qt resulting in
qt+h|Ft = qt exp
[
(α− 1
2
σ2 − Λk)h+ σ∆Wt
] Nt+h∏
j>Nt
Yj (4.6)
where Ft is the information set up to time t.
I assume Yj is log-normally distributed with parameters m and s, that is,
Yj = e
m+su, where u ∼ N(0, 1). (4.7)
If Yj are log-normally distributed, then the distribution of
qt+h
qt
will be log-normal too.
After taking logarithm on both sides of equation (4.6), I obtain
Z(h) = log qt+h − log qt (4.8)
= (α− 1
2
σ2 − Λk)h+ σ∆Wt +
Nt+h∑
j>Nt
log(Yj).
If the variable ∆Nh = Nt+h − Nt is the number of events during the period h, the variable
Z(h)|(∆Nh = n) will be normally distributed with mean Mn = (α − 12σ2 − Λk)h+ nm and
variance S2n = σ
2h+ns2. From E[Yj] = exp(m+ s
2/2), I get k ≡ exp(m+ s2/2)−1 since the
expected value of the mortality index percentage change k ≡ E[Yj − 1] if the Poisson event
occurs.
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The density function of Z(h), fZ(h)(z), can be written in terms of the conditional density
of Z(h)|(∆Nh = n), denoted fZ(h) (z|∆Nh = n), which has a normal distribution:
fZ(h)(z) =
∞∑
n=0
fZ(h) (z|∆Nh = n) Pr (∆Nh = n) (4.9)
=
∞∑
n=0
fZ(h) (z|∆Nh = n) e
−Λh (Λh)n
n!
=
∞∑
n=0
1
Sn
√
2pi
e−
1
2(
z−Mn
Sn
)
2 e−Λh (Λh)n
n!
.
If I have a time series of K observations of qt where t = 0, 1, 2, ..., K − 1, there will
be K − 1 observations of z’s with time interval equal to h = 1. In each time interval of
length h = 1, I assume that the probability of an event from time t to t + h is Λ and the
probability of more than one event during such a time interval is negligible. I can estimate
the parameters Λ, α, σ,m and s by maximizing the following loglikelihood function (4.10)
based on observations z1, z2, ..., zK−1:
K−1∑
i=1
logfZ(1)(zi) =
K−1∑
i=1
log
( ∞∑
n=0
fZ(1) (zi|∆Nh = n) Pr (∆Nh = n)
)
(4.10)
=
K−1∑
i=1
log
( ∞∑
n=0
1
Sn
√
2pi
e−
1
2(
zi−Mn
Sn
)
2 e−Λh (Λh)n
n!
)
≈
K−1∑
i=1
log
(
10∑
n=0
1
Sn
√
2pi
e−
1
2(
zi−Mn
Sn
)
2 e−Λh (Λh)n
n!
)
,
where Mn = (α − 12σ2 − Λk)h + nm and variance S2n = σ2h + ns2. For example, when n =
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Figure 4.2: 1900 – 1998 US Total Population Death Rate per 100,000 (= 100, 000qt where
t = 1900, 1901, ..., 1998).
0 or 1, I can get
M0 = α− 1
2
σ2 − Λ [exp(m+ s2/2)− 1] ,
M1 = α− 1
2
σ2 − Λ [exp(m+ s2/2)− 1]+m,
S20 = σ
2,
S21 = σ
2 + s2.
Data
My data are obtained from the Vital Statistics of the United States (VSUS).2 The VSUS
reports the United States age-adjusted death rates per 100,000 standard million population
(2000 standard) for selected causes of death. Age-adjusted death rates are used to compare
relative mortality risks across groups and over time; they are the indexes rather than the
direct measures. I plot my data from 1900 to 1998 in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2 shows that the mortality stochastic process does not follow a mean-reverting
2Source: http://www.cdc.gov.
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Table 4.3: Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates Based on the US Population Mortality
Index 1900 –1998. The likelihood ratio test rejects the model without jumps at the signif-
icance level of 0.1 percent and the Schwartz-Bayes criterion also rejects the model without
jumps.
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
α -0.0100 m -0.0233
σ 0.0302 s 0.1028
Λ 0.0536 k -0.0178
process.3 Moreover, there are several jumps in the US population mortality evolution which
should be captured by a good mortality stochastic model. Mortality shocks may cause
financial distress or bankruptcy of insurers or pension plans and they are also the risks
underlying the mortality securities.
Estimation results
Based on the US population mortality index qt from 1900 to 1998 shown in Figure 4.2, Table
4.3 reports my maximum likelihood estimation results. The instantaneous expected force of
mortality index α is equal to −0.0100. The negative sign of α suggests the US population
mortality improves over time. The instantaneous volatility of the mortality index, conditional
on no jumps, σ is equal to 0.0302. The estimate of the Poisson parameter Λ implies that the
mortality jump is approximately a one–in–twenty–years (1/Λ ≈ 20) event. My likelihood
ratio test rejects the model without jumps at the significance level of 0.1 percent.
4.5.3 Market Price of Risk of the Swiss Re Bond
Based on equations (4.2) and (4.6) and the US population mortality index from 1900 to
1998, my estimated market price of risk λ of the Swiss Re deal is 0.8657. Figure 4.3 shows
that the transformed probability density function (PDF) f ∗(q) with λ = 0.8657 by using
the two-factor Wang transform lies on the right of the PDF of the simulated US population
3However, it could be a process that is mean reverting around a trend.
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Figure 4.3: Two-factor Wang transformed probability distribution of q with λ = 0.8657 and
6 degrees of freedom (shown as broken line) and physical probability distribution of q (shown
as solid line). The horizontal axis is the one-year US population death rate and the vertical
axis stands for the probability.
mortality index f(q). After transforming the data, I put more weight on the right tail. It
implies that the market expects a higher probability of having a big loss than the actual
probability suggests.
Is the jump process important?
Most of the existing mortality stochastic models do not consider the jump process. In Section
4.5.2, I use the compound Poisson process to model the dynamics of the US population
mortality index. To prove the jump process is important in the mortality securitization
modeling, I compare the market price of risk without mortality jumps with that with jumps.4
The mortality stochastic model without jumps is shown as follows:
dqt
qt
= αn dt+ σn dWt, (4.11)
4I thank Patrick Brockett for his suggestion to add this part to the paper.
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Figure 4.4: Two-factor Wang Transformed Probability Distribution of q with λ = 0.8657
and 6 degrees of freedom (shown as “f∗(q) with jumps ”) in the jump model and that with
λ = 1.2523 and 6 degrees of freedom (shown as “f∗(q) without jumps ”) in the model without
jumps. The x-axis is the one-year US population death rate and the y axis stands for the
probability.
where αn and σn are the expected force and volatility of the US population mortality index
in the model without jumps. Based on the same data shown in Section 4.5.2, my maximum
likelihood estimate of αn is -0.0100 and 0.0388 for σn. Without jumps, my estimated market
price of risk for the US–based Swiss Re bond equals to 1.2523 which is 44 percent higher
than the market price of risk 0.8657 when I model the US population mortality index with
jumps. Moreover, I plot the transformed distributions with and without jumps in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4 shows that the transformed distribution with jumps has a fatter tail than that
without jumps. It implies that the model without jumps underestimates the probability of
having a catastrophe death event. Failing to model jumps leads to a big deviation from the
right market price of risk and the correct transformed distribution. I conclude that the jump
process plays an important role in the mortality securitization modeling.
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Is the Swiss Re bond a good deal for investors?
Wang (2000) reports that the average market price of risk of property catastrophe bonds is
about 0.45.5 Bantwal and Kunreuther (1999) found the spread of property catastrophe bonds
are too high to be explained by standard financial theory. Here I find the market price of risk
of the Swiss Re bond, 0.8657, is even higher than that of the property catastrophe bonds,
0.45. Although the high risk premium of the Swiss Re deal may suggest high transaction costs
of the first mortality security, it may also be interpreted as the Swiss Re overcompensates
the investors for their taking its mortality risks. The risk premium of the Swiss Re bond is
much higher than my model suggests. So it explains why the “appetite” for the Swiss Re
bond was strong.
Why did the Swiss Re company pay such a high risk premium to the investors? The Swiss
Re Company’s life reinsurance business accounted for 43 percent of its group revenues in 2002,
up from 38 percent in 2001 (MorganStanley, 2003). Although capital is crucial for a firm to
absorb mortality shocks, the true economic capital requirements of life reinsurance business
is not straightforward. Moreover, the costs of potential financial distress are high. Minton
et al. (2004) conclude that securitization of financial institutions is a contracting innovation
aimed at lowering financial distress costs. Therefore, MorganStanley (2003) concludes that
Swiss Re must be taking a view that the cost of capital that is relieved via this transaction
exceeds the effective net cost of servicing the bond. Moreover, insurance companies pay
high risk premiums to develop a mortality securitization market. If catastrophes deplete
traditional reinsurance risk-taking capacity, the insurers can turn to the mortality security
market for protection. In all, the Swiss Re mortality bond is a good deal to the investors.
5Applying the two-factor Wang transform with λ = 0.45, my calculated par spread for the Swiss Re bond
is 0.76 percent which is lower than that of the Swiss Re bond 1.35 percent. The difference may arise from the
fact that I use the US population index as the benchmark while the Swiss Re deal is based on the weighted
average of five developed countries. If I use the weighted index, I expect that my calculated par spread will
be even lower because of diversification effect of mortality risks among these five countries.
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4.5.4 Market Price of Risk of the EIB Bond
Applying the two-factor Wang transform based on the realized mortality rates of English
and Welsh males aged 65 and over in 2003 and the gilt STRIPS on November 18, 2004, I get
the market price of risk for the EIB bond λ = 0.2408. It is not surprising that the market
price of risk of the EIB bond (0.2408) is lower than that of the Swiss Re bond (0.8657)
since longevity risks have much less immediate and dramatic impact on annuity business
or pension plans (25 years or longer) than catastrophic death risks caused by disasters like
flu (less than a year) on life insurance business. The interesting question here is whether
the market price of risk of the EIB bond, λ = 0.2408, is too high for the potential bond
buyers—the UK pension plans.
Let’s compare the market price of risk of the EIB bond λ = 0.2408 with that of private
annuities. My calculated market price of risk of the average SPIA for the US male annuitants
aged (65) in Section 4.4.3 is 0.2318. The market price of risk reflects the costs of adverse
selection. Adverse selection is the tendency of persons with a higher-than-average chance of
loss to seek insurance at standard rates, results in higher-than-expected loss levels (?). For
example, healthy people purchase more annuities while those in poorer health buy more life
insurance. Prior literature concludes that pension plans have much less adverse selection
problem than commercial annuity insurers because both healthy and less healthy employees
participate in pension plans. Therefore the longevity risk for a pension plan should be lower
than that for a commercial annuity insurer. Moreover, since mortality experiences of the
English and Welsh population improve much less than that of the US population in the past
50 years (Cox et al., 2006), theoretically, the market price of risk for the EIB bond should
be lower than that for the US annuity business, 0.2318. However, it is not true for the EIB
bond. Therefore, it explains why the UK pension plans, the potential buyers of the EIB
bond, are not willing to buy the EIB bond since they can get cheaper protection from the
annuity or reinsurance markets.
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4.6 Conclusions and Discussion
A market for mortality-based securities will develop if the prices and contracting features
make the securities attractive to potential buyers and sellers. The Swiss Re bond sold well
but the EIB bond did not. I explain these opposite market outcomes by looking at their risk
premiums. To calculate the risk premiums I need models, analogous to the term structure
on interest rate models. The mortality bond market will be richer in that, in addition to
default free zero coupon bonds, it will have bonds which will be redeemed at face value
only if a specified number of lives survives or dies to the maturity date. I find only a few
preliminary papers on this topic. Development of the theory in this direction is important
as an extension of traditional bond market models and it would be very useful in explaining
mortality market risk to potential market participants.
My model shows that the Swiss Re mortality bond offers a higher risk premium to
investors than the property-linked catastrophe bonds. However, the EIB charges a very high
risk premium to take longevity risks in the UK pension plans. Since the price of the EIB
bond is not attractive, no UK pension plan buys this bond until now!
Someone may argue that the index–linked mortality securities are subject to unacceptable
levels of basis risk. The basis risk is low for the Swiss Re bond because the Swiss Re Company
is a global insurance leader occupying 25 percent of all global reinsurance business. It is
appropriate for it to link its mortality bond payments to the population indices. Moreover,
using the population indices is transparent to investors. Therefore it has no moral hazard
problem. Lastly, insurers may not be willing to disclose their underwriting experiences to
the public. If they used an index linked to their business, they would be forced to do so. On
the other hand, the EIB bond does not provide a good hedge for a pension plan: there exist
significant basis risk between the reference population mortality and that of an individual
pension plan. Basis risk problem further reduces the attractiveness of the EIB bond.
Moreover, the EIB bond requires a large up-front cash outflow to buyers. The hedgers
(e.g. the UK pension plans) have to put up the principal to the EIB for insurance. But
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it would make more sense for them just pay premium. The longevity bond I propose in
Chapter 3 is more feasible since it is structured like an option. Therefore, its premium will
be much lower than the principal of the EIB bond. The payoffs of the option would help the
hedgers to pay their annuity payments if the number of survivors exceeds the strike level.
In summary, I contribute to the mortality securitization literature by proposing a mortal-
ity stochastic model with jumps and pricing the mortality securities in an incomplete market
framework. My model nicely explains the opposite market outcomes of the Swiss Re deal
and the EIB bond. Finally I comment on the basis risk problem of these two bonds. I also
point out the design problem of the EIB bond. Again, it shows the attractiveness of the
Swiss Re deal but not for the EIB bond.
5
Household Life Cycle Protection: Life
Insurance Holdings, Financial
Vulnerability and Portfolio Implications
Using the Survey of Consumer Finances I examine the life cycle demand for different types of
life insurance. Specifically I test for the consumer’s avoidance of income volatility resulting
from the death of a household’s wage-earner through the purchase of life insurance. I first
develop a financial vulnerability index to control for the risk to the household. I then examine
the life cycle demand for life insurance using several definitions of life insurance. I find, in
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contrast to previous research, that there is a relationship between financial vulnerability
and the amount of term life or total life insurance purchased. In addition, I find older
consumers use less life insurance to protect a certain level of financial vulnerability than
younger consumers. Secondly, my study provides evidence that life insurance demand is
jointly determined as part of a household’s portfolio. Finally, I consider the impact of
family members’ non-monetary contribution on the household’s life cycle protection decision.
My results provide some evidence households take into account the value of non-monetary
contribution in their insurance purchase.
5.1 Introduction
A household’s demand for life insurance depends on its economic and demographic struc-
ture. Using the Survey of Consumer Finances, my study examines the life cycle demand for
different types of life insurance. First, I propose a financial vulnerability index to capture
a household’s financial insecurity. I define financial vulnerability as the household’s living
standard volatility as a result of the death of wage-earning household member. It is de-
termined by the labor and non-labor income and death probability of each adult household
member, the consumption to income ratio, and the effect of age on future consumption needs.
I examine the demand for life insurance using several types of life insurance. Secondly, I
examine household financial portfolios to see the relationship between insurance and other
assets. Finally, I consider the impact of family members’ non-monetary contribution (e.g.
housework) on the household’s life cycle protection decision.
Merton (1975) indicated that the usual sources of consumer uncertainty include uncer-
tainty about future capital income, future labor income (human capital), age at death, in-
vestment opportunities, and relative prices of consumer goods. Holden et al. (1986) and Hurd
and Wise (1989) document sharp declines in living standards and increases in poverty rates
among women whose husbands passed away. Analyzing data gathered during the 1960s from
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households in middle-age through early retirement, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, 1991a,b)
found that roughly one-third of wives and secondary earners would have seen their living
standards decline by 25 percent or more had their spouses actually died. While I know that
life insurance can be demanded for a number of reasons, I look in particular at the life cycle
income protection rationale for demanding life insurance.
Based on the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), my paper studies the relationship
between a household’s financial vulnerability and its total life insurance held on the lives of
both spouses. I focus explicitly on those households with a married couple, with both spouses
between 20 and 64 years of age, and at least one of the spouses having regular earnings as
an employee. The key determinant of the demand for life insurance is the effect of the
insured’s death on the future consumption of the other household members. My financial
vulnerability index measures the financial vulnerability by the volatility of a household’s
living standard as a whole. It fits into the SCF data nicely because the SCF reports the
total amount of life insurance held by each household, and not on the individual demand for
life insurance by each spouse. My financial vulnerability index does a good job in explaining
the financial vulnerability of a household because it is transparent, easy to implement and
based on weaker assumptions. In contrast to previous research, e.g. Bernheim et al. (2001),
I find a relationship between financial vulnerability and purchases of term life insurance and
a relationship between vulnerability and total (sum of term life and whole life net amount at
risk) purchases while this positive relationship is not consistently significant for net amount
at risk of whole life insurance. Moreover, my life cycle empirical results show that the
sensitivity of total life insurance to financial vulnerability decreases for older households. It
suggests younger households are likely to use more life insurance to manage their financial
vulnerability but the household substitutes away from higher priced life insurance towards
other assets as it ages.
My empirical analysis of consumer portfolios suggests that individual retirement accounts
are complements to total life insurance for the young- and middle-aged and real estate are
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complements to total life insurance only for the youngest. However, bonds are a substitute
for term life insurance for older households.
Finally, I examine whether the household’s life cycle protection decision takes into account
non-monetary contribution of family members. I use the Heckman (1979)’s two-step method
to impute the value of housework. My results provide some evidence households take into
account the value of non-monetary contribution in their insurance purchase. The households
are slightly less sensitive to their financial vulnerability as measured by lower insurance
demand in this case because the “imputed” housework value increases their wealth and
makes them appear less risk averse.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides my method for measuring financial
vulnerability, and section 5.3 describes the data, hypotheses and methodology. Section 5.4
shows the results of the life cycle relationship between households’ life insurance holdings
and financial vulnerability. I then examine the household’s financial portfolio to see the life
cycle relationship between life insurance and other assets. I impute the value of the non-
monetary contribution and retest the household’s life cycle protection decision in Section
5.5. The final section summarizes the study.
5.2 A Different Strategy for Measuring Financial Vul-
nerability
Bernheim et al. (2001) adopt a yardstick to measure a household’s financial vulnerability:
the percentage decline in an individual’s sustainable living standard that would result from
a spouse’s death. To calculate this decline, they make use of a relatively sophisticated,
but proprietary life cycle consumption model embodied in the financial planning software,
Economic Security Planner (or ESPlanner).1 They do not find a relationship between a
1Economic Security Planner, Inc. provides free copies of the software for academic research:
www.ESPlanner.com.
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household’s life insurance holding and its financial vulnerability.
My financial vulnerability index is also a life cycle measure as it reflects different living
standards among households, different living standards for households before and after a
spouse dies, absolute consumption needs of a surviving spouse (and other members of the
family) and age effects. However, my financial vulnerability index is different from that of
Bernheim et al. (2001). It has several advantages: my index is more transparent and easier to
implement. I can directly use it to study households’ life-cycle protection by using different
types of life insurance. Moreover, my index is based on weaker assumptions.
5.2.1 Financial Vulnerability Index
One of the primary assumptions regarding a couple’s standard of living involves determining
the relative cost savings from living together versus separately. There are fixed costs of
operating a household which can be “shared” between spouses. I use the value 0.678 which
was suggested by Bernheim et al. (2001) to indicate the household scale economies.2 It
implies that a two-adult household must spend 1.5999 (=20.678) times as much as a one-
adult household to achieve the same living standard. In other words, the two-adult household
spends 0.4001 ( = 2 - 1.5999) less than that if they live separately. Bernheim et al. (2001)
further considered the effects of the number of the children and use OECD child-adult
equivalency factor 0.5. I also use this equivalency factor.
Moreover, households with different income levels consume different proportion of their
income. The US Department of Labor provides the annual income and expenditures survey
report, the Consumer Expenditures, based on approximately 7,500 sample households (5,000
prior to 1999) every year.3 I observe, in general, low income people spend all of their income
while high income households are able to save. That is, the ratio of consumption to labor and
2The OECD uses a value of 0.7 for the exponent (see Ringen (1991)).
3From http://www.bls.gov/cex/home.htm. Annual income and expenditures integrated from the Interview
and Diary surveys in varying detail, classified by income, age, consumer unit size, and other demographic
characteristics of consumer units, since 1984. Annual income and expenditures from the Interview and Diary
surveys by selected consumer unit characteristics, since 1980.
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non-labor income before taxes and deductions varies for each household. The relationship
between a household’s overall consumption (Cˆi) and labor and non-labor income before taxes
and deductions (Tincomei) for household i is shown as
Cˆi = αi ∗ Tincomei, (5.1)
where αi is so-called consumption to income ratio. Based on Table 2 in the Consumer Ex-
penditures each year,4 I calculate the annual consumption to income ratios in equation (5.1)
for households in different levels of income before taxes. That is, household i’s consumption
to income ratio αi may be different from household j’s ratio αj. For example, in 1998, if
the households earn income before taxes in the range of $40,000 - $49,999, their annual
consumption to income before taxes ratio is 0.90. It suggests that these households save
10 percent of their income before tax. This ratio decreases to 0.84 for the households with
the income before taxes in the range $50,000 - $69,999. Thus higher income households
save more. However, the households with the income less than $30,000 consume all of their
income and save nothing. In my model, it implies that their consumption to income ratio is
1.
Moreover, the consumption to total income ratio is also not constant before and after a
spouse dies. That is, a wife’s consumption to total income ratio if her husband dies βwife,i
and that for a husband if his wife dies βhus,i vary with reduced total income if one of spouses
dies. Suppose a household’s total income before taxes in the 1998 Survey of Consumer
Finances is $55,000. It includes the husband’s labor income of $40,000, the wife’s labor
income of $10,000 and the household’s overall non-labor income of $5,000. If both of the
4Before 2003, the Consumer Expenditures reported the detailed annual consumption and income infor-
mation for the households with complete reporting income up to $70,000. From 2003, the US Department
of Labor began to report detailed annual consumption and income for higher income households. I notice
that the consumption to income before taxes ratios of households in the same income levels do not vary a
lot among years. In order to get a more complete picture of households’ consumption and income, I assume
that the consumption to income ratios for households with income before taxes higher than $70,000 per year
in 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001 follows that in 2003 after I adjust all consumption and income in 2001 dollars.
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spouses survive, αi = 0.84. If the husband dies, the household income falls to $15,000 (=
$55,000 - $40,000). So βwife,i = 1. If the wife dies, the household income falls to $45,000 (=
$55,000 - $10,000) and βhus,i = 0.90. If household j has a different total income before taxes,
its αj, βwife,j and βhus,j may be different from αi, βwife,i and βhus,i of household i.
When both of spouses are alive, the living standard of the household i is
Ci = αi
Tincomei
(2 + N
2
)0.678
. (5.2)
The variable Tincomei is the labor and non-labor income before taxes and deductions of
household i in $100,000s and Ci is the living standard of household i when both of spouses
are alive. N is the number of the dependent children, and 20.678 measures the household
scale economies.
When the husband dies, the living standard of the wife Cwife,i becomes
Cwife,i = βwife,i
Tincomei − Yhus,i
(1 + N
2
)0.678
. (5.3)
The variable Yhus,i is the husband’s total employment income of the household i in $100,000s
and βwife,i is the wife’s (and other family members’) consumption to total income ratio if
the husband dies. The reason why I only deduct the husband’s labor income Yhus,i from the
household’s total income, Tincomei, is that although the wife (and other members of the
family) loses the husband’s labor income, Yhus,i, she inherits her husband’s non-labor income,
e.g. from financial assets.
The impact on the household i if the husband dies (IMPACTwife,i) can be expressed as
the percentage decline in its living standard:
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IMPACTwife,i =
Cwife,i
Ci
− 1 = βwife,i(Tincomei − Yhus,i)(2 +
N
2
)0.678
αiTincomei(1 +
N
2
)0.678
− 1. (5.4)
Correspondingly, when the wife dies, the living standard of the husband Chus,i is
Chus,i = βhus,i
Tincomei − Ywife,i
(1 + N
2
)0.678
, (5.5)
where the variable Ywife,i is the wife’s employment income of the household i in $100,000s
and βhus,i is the husband’s (and other family members’) consumption to total income ratio
if the wife dies.
The impact on the household i if the wife dies (IMPACThus,i) is given by
IMPACThus,i =
Chus,i
Ci
− 1 = βhus,i(Tincomei − Ywife,i)(2 +
N
2
)0.678
αiTincomei(1 +
N
2
)0.678
− 1. (5.6)
The variables IMPACTwife,i and IMPACThus,i defined in equations (5.4) and (5.6) re-
spectively only reflect the relative household living standard decline if one of the spouses
dies. However, the surviving spouse (and other members of the family) cares about absolute
consumption. The lost absolute labor income of the dead spouse causes an absolute living
standard decline for the surviving spouse (and other members of the family). All else equal,
the wife with the higher labor income from her husband will incur a higher absolute con-
sumption decline than the other wife with lower husband’s labor income. To see how this
matters, assume that two wives in households i and j respectively will incur the same relative
living standard decline if their husbands die, that is,
IMPACTwife,i = IMPACTwife,j ⇒ Cwife,i
Ci
− 1 = Cwife,j
Cj
− 1. (5.7)
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However, each wife’s absolute living standard decline may be different and determined by
the lost labor income from her husband. To account for this possibility, I multiply the
relative living standard decline measure of the wife IMPACTwife,i by the husband’s labor
income Yhus,i to capture the absolute living standard decline of the wife. The absolute living
standard decline of the husband is similarly defined.
I also consider an age effect. The effect of age on future consumption needs is not
the same for the old family and the young household. An older family maybe much less
vulnerable than a younger family to the death of its more important wage-earner because
of the smaller expected number of surviving years left for the survivor. The idea is shown
in Figure 5.1. The upper graph in Figure 5.1 shows the effect of husband’s age x on the
household’s future consumption needs. Assume that the husband, age x, plans to retire at
age 65. If the husband dies at age x, the household will incur annual absolute living standard
decline (IMPACTwife,i · Yhus,i) for (65 − x) years. Assuming a flat interest rate 5 percent,5
an annuity factor, a 65− x , captures the age effect of the husband’s death at age x. The
higher a 65− x implies a larger effect of his age on future consumption needs of other family
members. Similarly, a 65− y represents the wife’s age effect and is illustrated in the lower
graph in Figure 5.1.
Taking into account all of the above factors, my index of financial vulnerability (IMPACTi)
of the household i is then defined as
IMPACTi =
√
qhusx,i (IMPACTwife,i · Yhus,i · a 65− x )2 + qwifey,i (IMPACThus,i · Ywife,i · a 65− y )2.
(5.8)
The index I defined is similar to the definition of standard deviation. The variable qhusx,i
is the one-year death probability of the husband aged x of the household i in the survey
year and qwifey,i the one-year death probability of the wife aged y of the household i in the
5My results are robust to other interest rate assumptions.
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Figure 5.1: The age effect of spouses on future consumption needs of other family members
survey year. I use the 1990-1995 US SOA Life Insurance Basic Mortality Table to capture
the mortality experience of the observed household. The reason why I use a one-year death
probability is that the current life insurance holding reflects the household’s expectation of
its potential risks if one of spouses dies in the foreseeable future, e.g. one year. The variables
Yhus,i and Ywife,i are the husband’s and wife’s total employment income of the household i in
$100,000s respectively. The variable IMPACTwife,i (IMPACThus,i) accounts for the relative
living standard decline of household i if the husband (the wife) dies. The product in the first
pair of brackets in equation (5.8) reflects the overall impact of husband’s death at age x on
the household. It equals to annual absolute living standard decline (or deviation from current
absolute living standard) IMPACTwife,i ·Yhus,i times the age effect, a 65− x . The overall effect
of wife’s death at age y is similarly defined and is the product in the second pair of brackets
in equation (5.8). Moreover, my index solves one of the main problems of using the Survey
of Consumer Finances as it reports the results of the survey based on a household instead of
an individual. My index measures the financial vulnerability by the volatility of a couple’s
living standard as a whole. Thus, IMPACTi captures the volatility of a household’s financial
situation if one spouse dies.
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5.2.2 Advantages of Proposed Financial Vulnerability Index
Based on the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), Bernheim et al. (2001) also study
households’ financial vulnerabilities by comparing an individual’s highest sustainable living
standard when both of spouses survive, C∗, with Cns which represents the living standard the
husband (when s = husband) or the wife (when s = wife) would enjoy without life insurance.
They define their financial vulnerability index as follows:
IMPACTBernheim =
Cns
C∗
− 1. (5.9)
Bernheim et al. (2001) run the regression of the households’ actual life insurance hold-
ings on their benchmark life insurance (or benchmark life insurance to household income)
rather than on their financial vulnerability measure in Equation (5.9). Their benchmark life
insurance quantity is obtained from Economic Security Planner (or ESPlanner). Different
financial planning software often gives us very different life insurance purchase suggestions.
An important issue is that if the ESPlanner is inaccurate, it will come up with an incorrect
benchmark life insurance and thus will lead to incorrect conclusions. While I do not suggest
ESP is inaccurate, I cannot tell how the model underlying their conclusions is set up. My
financial vulnerability index is different from theirs and can act as a compliment to their
method. Compared with Bernheim et al. (2001)’s financial vulnerability measure, my index
has the following advantages:
• Transparency: Bernheim et al. (2001) use a life-cycle financial planning software, Eco-
nomic Security Planner (or ESPlanner) to determine the benchmark life insurance
demand. Their method is not transparent: it is hard to tell how the ESPlanner works
and what its underlying assumptions are. The key determinant of the demand for life
insurance is the effect of the insured’s death on the future consumption of the other
household members because they will lose the insured’s labor income forever. My
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financial vulnerability index transparently measures this effect by including the lost
absolute consumption, the consumption to labor earnings ratios αi, and the life-cycle
effects.
• Implementation: The cost associated with compiling data and modeling households’ fi-
nancial vulnerabilities is a substantial obstacle in investigating the relationship between
household’s life insurance holdings and financial insecurity. A complete description of
Bernheim et al. (2001)’s model would be “prohibitively lengthy” (p.7 in Bernheim
et al. (2001)). I present a method of estimating financial vulnerabilities that is eas-
ily implemented using data from the SCF and Consumer Expenditures and is easily
understood.
• Broader product comparison possible: There are differences between term life insurance
and whole life insurance which are overlooked in Bernheim et al. (2001). First, whole
life insurance has a cash value while term life insurance has no cash value. Second, the
duration of whole life insurance is generally much longer than term insurance. Third,
term life insurance is naturally suited for ensuring that mortgages and other loans are
paid on the debtor/insured’s death and as a vehicle for ensuring that education or other
needs are available if death were to cut short the period needed for the provider/insured
to earn the needed funds. Further, whole life insurance can serve as a quasi-forced
savings plan (Black and Skipper, 2000). The differences between the two types of
insurance may lead to differences in the household’s insurance purchasing behavior.
Bernheim et al. (2001) fail to make distinctions between term life insurance and whole
life insurance demand in their analysis. However, our financial vulnerability index is
able to do so.
• Weaker assumptions: Bernheim et al. (2001) state that, “ [T]his is a measure of the
percent by which the survivor’s living standard would, with no insurance protection,
fall short of or exceed the couple’s highest sustainable living standard (p. 6).” If I
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understand their “highest sustainable living standard” correctly, my concern is whether
it is appropriate to use the highest sustainable living standard to obtain the benchmark.
In reality, people normally lead a life style below their highest living standard. If
consumers are prudent, they will set aside some money for a “rainy day” (Kimball,
1990). My measure is based on a more typical consumption level.
5.3 Data, Hypotheses and Methodology
I now turn to an empirical examination of a household’s life cycle protection. First, I
investigate the effects of financial vulnerability on the households’ demand for net amount
at risk, term life insurance and total life insurance. Net amount at risk is my measure
of households’ long-term pure life insurance demand. Term life insurance measures the
quantity of short-term life insurance demanded. And total life insurance is my measure
of households’ total life insurance demand. Second, households hold various asset items
including life insurance in a portfolio. Life insurance demand is determined, in part, by
households’ financial asset allocation decisions. I empirically test how each asset item may
influence life insurance holdings. Finally, a family member who has zero earnings may make
non-monetary contributions to the family. For instance, one spouse who stays at home
cleans, cooks and cares for children contributes to household income. The family would
suffer a serious financial setback if this spouse dies. Therefore I retest the household life
cycle protection by imputing a value for uncompensated housework in Section 5.5.
5.3.1 Data Description
The sample for my study consists of the 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001 years of the Survey of
Consumer Finances. In each of these four years, the survey covered over 4,000 households.
The data includes demographic, income, wealth, debt and credit, pensions, attitudes about
financial matters, the nature of transactions with various types of financial institutions, hous-
CHAPTER 5. HOUSEHOLD LIFE CYCLE PROTECTION 97
ing, real estate, business, vehicles, health and life insurance, current and past employment,
current social security benefits, inheritances, charitable contributions, education, and retire-
ment plans. The architects of the SCF data files imputed missing information, supplying
five “implicates” for each household.6 Bernheim et al. (2001) use the first implicate. I also
use the first implicate in this study to compare my results and theirs.7
I focus on households with married couples. Because I are looking at those who potentially
have a need for life insurance I restrict the ages of both spouses to a range from 20 to
64. Following Bernheim et al. (2001), I exclude those observations where neither spouse
had regular labor earnings. Accurate measurement of life insurance holdings is particularly
critical for my analysis. Fortunately, the SCF data match up reasonably well with other
sources of information concerning this life insurance.8 Moreover, including consistent labor
income measures is also important because they are two major variables determining my
financial vulnerability index. I delete those observations with labor income paid by lump
sum, one payment only/in total, by the piece/job and if the pay varies. The SCF reports
the husband’s labor income and the wife’s labor income respectively. It also reports the
household’s total labor income. I double check to make sure that the sum of the husband’s
labor income and that of the wife is the same (or almost the same) as the household’s total
labor income. In all, I identify around one percent of my sample as outliers.
An important characteristic of the SCF is that it contains information only on the total
amount of term life insurance and total amount of whole life insurance held by each house-
hold, and not on the division of this insurance between spouses. Bernheim et al. (2001)
estimate a regression model explaining the fraction of a couple’s total life insurance held
6Kennickell (1994) provides a description of the imputation procedure.
7The problem of using only one of the five imputed data sets is that the true variances of the estimated
coefficients are inflated (Bernheim et al., 2003). This implies that the standard errors from my paper are
too large but I note significance in many important variables.
8Bernheim et al. (2001) made some comparisons between statistics on life insurance coverage (including
all individual and group policies) drawn from the SCF and from a survey fielded by the life Insurance
Marketing Research Organization (LIMRA). Furthermore, they computed the aggregate amount of in-force
life insurance implied by the SCF survey responses, and compared this with total in-force life insurance
reported by the industry (obtained from the ACLI (1999)). They concluded that there is no indication that
the SCF understates life insurance coverage.
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on the life of husband as a function of the age of each spouse, the husband’s earnings, the
husband’s share of the couple’s total non-asset income, family size, and the husband’s share
of the couple’s total benchmark life insurance. Due to the nature of the data, this type of
estimation may be biased because it does not look at “household” purchases of insurance
(Lewis, 1989). It could lead to the conclusion that there is no correlation between life insur-
ance demand and a household’s financial vulnerability. Thus, I explore the relation between
different types of life insurance demand and financial vulnerability directly based on the
structure and characteristics of the household.
5.3.2 Dependent Variables and Hypotheses
The face value of life insurance is the amount an insurer will pay to the beneficiary when
the insured dies. The face value reflects the amount a household perceives is appropriate to
manage its financial vulnerability. However, there is a problem with face value of whole life
insurance because the actual amount of pure whole life insurance protection at any point
is the difference between the policy cash value (saving component) at that point and the
face amount. This difference is called the net amount at risk (Black and Skipper, 2000).
Therefore, the net amount at risk is a more appropriate proxy of the quantity of whole
life insurance demanded than the whole life insurance face value. From the perspective of
consumers, I consider the “net amount at risk” of whole life insurance as the proxy of whole
life insurance quantity demanded and the face value of term life insurance as the proxy of
term life insurance quantity demanded. Because of the skewness of the face value of term
life insurance or the net amount at risk, I use a logarithmic transformation. Since Bernheim
et al. (2001) explore the relationship based on the total insurance demand, I also study this
relationship by using the sum of term life insurance face value and the net amount at risk
of whole life insurance.
According to Ando and Modigliani (1963)’s life cycle theory, an individual’s income will
be low in the beginning and end stages of life and high during the middle income-earning years
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of life. Term insurance can be useful for persons with low incomes and high insurance needs
because of its relatively low price (Black and Skipper, 2000). Since younger families have
lower income and less wealth accumulation, they may desire lower-cost insurance protection.
On the other hand, older households maybe less vulnerable than younger families to the death
of the more important wage-earner because of the smaller expected number of surviving years
left for the survivor. Moreover, older households may be less risk averse because they have
already accumulated a certain amount of wealth. In addition, Chen et al. (2001) find that
baby boomers tend to purchase less life insurance than those in previous generations. Baby
boomers are in the middle-age and older-age groups in my study. I predict that there will
be a more significant relationship between younger household’s life insurance holdings and
its financial vulnerability.
5.3.3 Other Explanatory Variables and Hypotheses
In addition to independent variable IMPACTi, other differences, such as demographic char-
acteristics, financial situation and obligations, among couples are expected to affect life
insurance demand. Identifying those factors will give us a clearer picture on the relation-
ship between life insurance demand and financial vulnerability and between life insurance
holdings and other assets.
Assets
Intuitively, the wealth a person holds will influence life insurance purchases. The relation be-
tween the demand for life insurance and wealth is ambiguous as it depends upon a consumer’s
risk tolerance. It is possible that an individual increases his life insurance demand with in-
creasing wealth. It is also possible that a person will mainly put the incremental wealth into
savings because he thinks he can handle risks with his improved economic strength. If so, life
insurance can be an inferior good. Fortune (1973) found that per capita wealth was related
negatively to “net” life insurance in force. This was attributed to the fact that increases in
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wealth lead to decreases in aversion to risk.
Life insurance demand is determined by a household’s asset allocation decisions. Fortune
(1973) concludes life insurance is a substitute for financial assets such as equities or other
lower risk assets. Headen and Lee (1974) propose a four-component interrelated household
asset model including primary securities (corporate stocks and bonds), money (currency
and demand deposits), time deposits (all savings shares and various time deposits) and life
insurance sales (ordinary). However, their results on the relationship between life insurance
demand and other financial assets are inconclusive. They find limited evidence that life
insurance decreases with investment in stocks, bonds and increases with saving account
holdings.
Individual retirement accounts are also saving accounts with tax advantages. Higher
rates of net saving is assumed to be positively correlated with life insurance demand since
life insurance is a primary financial asset alternative for low-asset holders (Headen and Lee,
1974). Household financial assets also include annuities. Brown (1999) finds evidence that
many households simultaneously hold term life insurance and private annuities. Moreover,
Bernheim et al. (2001) state that housing may also affect life insurance needs. Although
they treat housing as fixed consumption, I look at real estate holdings as a part of household
assets. Households often purchase term life insurance to ensure that mortgages are paid on
the debtor/insured’s death.
In order to identify the effect of different types of assets on the different types of life
demand, I split the assets into several categories. I include cash and cash equivalents,
mutual funds, stocks, bonds, annuities, individual retirement accounts, real estate and other
assets. All of the above assets are all measured based on the unit of the household using the
log value.
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Debts
Good risk management principles suggest the family unit should be protected against catastrophic
losses. Life insurance can be a way to ensure that mortgages and other obligations are paid on
the insured’s death. Again, it is ambiguous whether there is a positive relationship between
life insurance holdings and debts of a household.
Education
Education tends to be a good predictor of earning ability over the long term. It is also asso-
ciated with wealth, financial vulnerability and life insurance demand. Burnett and Palmer
(1984) show that higher education is associated with higher life insurance demand even al-
lowing for the higher incomes. However, Goldsmith (1983) concludes that households with
a more educated wife, ceteris paribus, have a lower likelihood of purchasing term insurance
on the husband. Thus the overall effect of education on a household’s insurance holdings is
uncertain.
Inheritance, Obligations, Bequests and Emergencies
In the SCF, there is a question concerning an expected inheritance. Thus, I am able to
control for a potential substitute for life insurance. Also the survey asked whether there
are any foreseeable major financial obligations expected to be met in the future such as
educational expenses, health care costs and so forth. I control for fixed obligations that life
insurance may finance if one of spouses dies. Finally, I consider a household’s desire to leave
a bequest and also include it as one of independent variables.
Term Life Insurance
Term life insurance furnishes protection for a limited number of years at the end of which the
policy expires, meaning that it terminates with no maturity value. The face amount of the
policy is payable only if the insured’s death occurs during the stipulated term, and nothing
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is paid in case of survival. Term insurance can be the basis for one’s permanent insurance
program through a so-called buy-term-and-invest-the-difference (BTID) arrangement. The
difference between the higher-premium cash-value policy and the lower-premium term policy
is to be invested separately, such as in a mutual fund, savings account, an annuity, or other
investment media. The hope is that the term plus the separate investment will outperform
the cash-value life insurance policy (Black and Skipper, 2000). Thus, I predict that the term
life insurance is a substitute for the whole life insurance. So I use the log value of the term
life face value in the net amount at risk function and the log value of the net amount at risk
value in term life insurance demand function.
Age
The relationship between age and life insurance is ambiguous. Burnett and Palmer (1984) do
not find a significant relationship between age and life insurance holdings. For older people,
they may have a greater desire to leave a bequest. However, they may have a binding budget
constraint when approaching retirement. Following Bernheim et al. (2001), I control for the
effects of age by two ways. In the first way, I include linear and quadratic terms in the
couple’s average age. On the other hand, in the second way, I divide my sample into three
age groups. Three age dummies are assigned to these three groups.
Income
I include household labor income in my model. Income, like wealth, may have ambiguous
effects on the life insurance demand. If the consumer has decreasing absolute risk aversion,
he will purchase less insurance at higher levels of income due to decreasing marginal utility
of income. However, I know that as income increases new types of risks arise. For example,
consumers may buy bigger houses and may incur more expensive obligations. Thus, one could
hypothesize a positive relationship between income and insurance demand. Burnett and
Palmer (1984) find a significant and positive relationship between income and life insurance
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holdings.
5.3.4 Summary Statistics
My final sample consists of 6,755 married couples for the 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001 years
of the Survey of Consumer Finances. Variables in dollars are all in year 2001 dollars. Table
5.1 shows the descriptive statistics for my sample. “Net amount at risk” is the difference
between face value of whole life insurance and whole life cash value. “Salary and wage” refers
to labor income. “Cash and cash equivalent” includes checking accounts, saving accounts,
money market deposit accounts, money market mutual funds, call accounts at brokerages
and certificates of deposit. “Mutual fund” includes stock mutual funds, tax-free bond mu-
tual funds, government bond mutual funds, other bond mutual funds, combination and other
mutual funds and total directly-held mutual funds, excluding market-money mutual funds.
“Stock” refers to the publicly traded stock. “Bond” includes tax-exempt bonds (state and
local bonds), mortgage-backed bonds, US government and government agency bonds and
bills, corporate and foreign bonds and savings bonds. “A household’s individual retirement
account” includes individual retirement account, thrift accounts and future pensions. “In-
dividual annuity not including job pension” refers to other managed assets such as trusts,
annuities and managed investment accounts in which a household has equity interest. “Real
estate” is the sum of the value of primary residence, other residential real estate and net
equity in nonresidential real estate. If a household only owns a part of the property, the
value reported should be only the household’s share. “Other assets” are a household’s total
assets excluding whole life cash value, cash, mutual fund, stock, bond, individual annuity
not including job pension, individual retirement account and real estate. The education level
of respondents and spouses reflects the number of years of schooling.
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5.3.5 Estimation Methodology
The regression on the SCF data using ordinary least squares (OLS) are potentially prob-
lematical because there is about 35 percent zero term life face value, 58 percent zero whole
life face value and 16 percent zero total life insurance face value. Tobit models under this
situation will give us consistent estimates. So I employ the ordinary tobit estimation of the
life insurance demand model. In addition to the dependent variable to measure whole life in-
surance demanded (log of net amount at risk of whole life), I estimate another two quantities:
log of term life face value and log of sum of term life face value and whole life net amount
at risk. Since there are many zero values in my dependent variables, I add a relatively small
value (0.00001) to those with zero. I then test for the sensitivity with respect to adding this
small value and find that the results are robust to size of the data transformation.
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Moreover, the pooled results will be overstated if the inclusion of the same household for
multiple years results in observations that are not independent (although the SCF data is
not a panel data). Therefore, I run the regressions and report the estimates by year.9
5.4 Life Cycle Protection Analysis
5.4.1 Financial Vulnerability
I first analyze households’ life-cycle life insurance holding and financial vulnerability without
including asset items. I run the tobit regressions by year. The dependent variables are three
definitions of life insurance demanded (net amount at risk of whole life, term life face value
and sum of whole life net amount at risk and term life face value respectively). There are
two separate set of results. For the first set of regression, I include linear and quadratic
terms in the couple’s average age.
Log(LifeIns) = α3 + γIMPACT + β1Age + β2Age
2 + ε1, (5.10)
where LifeIns stands for three different dependent variables representing quantity of insur-
ance demanded. IMPACT is my financial vulnerability index. I expect the coefficient γ is
positive which means that a household increases its life insurance holdings with increasing
financial vulnerability. The variable Age stands for the couple’s average age.10
In the second set of regression, I adopt a more flexible functional specification proposed
by Bernheim et al. (2001). That is, I divide my sample into three age groups and assign a
group dummy for each group. Moreover, I interact these group dummies with my financial
9My results are even stronger when I pool four waves of the survey.
10Originally, I also included an interaction term between age and my financial vulnerability index to
investigate the hypothesis that the correlation between insurance holdings and vulnerabilities changes with
age. However, including this interaction term caused a serious multi-collinearity problem since the Pearson’s
correlation between the interaction term and financial vulnerability index was as high as 0.98.
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vulnerability index.
Log(LifeIns) =α1A20−34 + α2A35−49 + α3A50−64 (5.11)
+ γ1IMPACT · A20−34 + γ2IMPACT · A35−49 + γ3IMPACT · A50−64 + ε2,
where A20−34, A35−49 and A50−64 are age dummies for age group 20 - 34, 35 - 49 and 50 - 64
respectively.
In the first separate set of age definition, the regression results in Table 5.2 show that
there is a significant and positive relationship between a household’s financial vulnerability
and net amount at risk as the marginal effects of the financial vulnerability index are all
significant in most cases except year 1998. Regression results based on a more flexible
functional specification suggest that the positive and significant relationship in 1992, 1995
and 2001 is driven by the middle and older age groups because the interaction terms of age
group dummy and financial vulnerability index are positive and significant for those two
groups but not for the younger families. It implies that younger households do not purchase
whole life insurance to manage its potential financial insecurity caused by the death of the
income earner(s).
An important conclusion to be drawn from Table 5.3 is that there is a positive and sig-
nificant relationship between a household’s term life insurance and its financial vulnerability
in all four time periods in the first specification. Moreover, the second specification suggests
that younger households tend to purchase term life insurance, an opposite picture to what I
conclude for the whole life insurance from Table 5.2. It is not a surprising result. Whole life
insurance is more expensive than term life insurance. Younger households have not accumu-
lated enough wealth (or consume too much annual income) to purchase whole life insurance
and therefore prefer term life insurance.
Table 5.4 shows the results when the dependent variable is the sum of net amount at risk
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and term life insurance. Both the first specification and the second specification in all four
years tell us the same story: the higher volatility of potential living standard implies more
total life insurance purchases. In general, households in different ages use a combination of
term life and net amount at risk to reduce their potential financial vulnerability. Moreover,
according to the results of the second specification, younger households are more sensitive
to financial vulnerability than older households because the coefficient of interaction term of
financial vulnerability index and age group 20 - 34 is higher than the interaction terms for
the other two age groups (e.g. 6.4232 for younger group vs. 4.6381 and 4.9168 for middle
and older groups in 2001) except year 1992. I conclude that there is a life cycle relationship
between a household’s life insurance holdings and its financial vulnerability. My results are
opposite to Bernheim et al. (2001)’s conclusion because they do not find this relationship
specifically as they only look at total life purchases in 1995.
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5.4.2 Portfolio Implications
Headen and Lee (1974) explore the linkage between life insurance demand and household
financial assets. They construct a four–component interrelated household asset estimated
using primary securities, money, time deposits and ordinary life insurance sales. They use
another four variables reflecting household expectations and current economic conditions in
financial markets: net savings, the consumer sentiment index (reflecting household expec-
tations of future prices, income, and general economic conditions), interest rates (on high
grade bonds) and index of security prices. Given the low t-ratios for lagged alternative as-
sets, they conclude that the evidence concerning the relation of life insurance demand and
other alternative financial assets is not certain. The variables Headen and Lee (1974) define
are macroeconomic oriented. For example, they use ordinary life insurance sales as life insur-
ance demand and they investigate stocks and bonds quarterly flowing to household sector.
However, they do not explore the life cycle effects and do not study the term insurance and
whole life insurance separately.
I, on the other hand, investigate a household’s life insurance purchasing behavior from a
microeconomic perspective and treat each household as a unit. Although I have found a life
cycle relationship between life insurance and financial vulnerability, it may be interesting to
further determine the life cycle relationship between a household life insurance holding and
other assets. My regression is shown as follows:
Log(LifeIns) =γ4IMPACT + α4A20−34 + α5A35−49 + α6A50−64 (5.12)
+
n∑
i
δ1iAsseti · A20−34 +
n∑
i
δ2iAsseti · A35−49 +
n∑
i
δ3iAsseti · A50−64
+ βX ′ + ε3,
where the variable Asseti stands for asset item i including cash, stocks, bonds, mutual fund,
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annuities, individual retirement accounts and real estate. The vectorX includes other control
variables.
I focus on the relationship of a household’s life insurance holdings with its different kinds
of financial assets: cash, stocks, bonds, mutual fund, annuities, individual retirement ac-
counts and real estate. I run the tobit regressions by year and get similar results as those
for year 2001 shown in Table 5.5. My results in Table 5.5 suggest that most of the life-cycle
relationships between life insurance holdings and different asset items are insignificant be-
cause the interaction terms of different assets and age group dummies are not significant.
I find limited positive (negative) relationship between individual retirement accounts, an-
nuities and real estate (bonds) respectively with life insurance holdings which is consistent
with the existing literature (Fortune, 1973; Headen and Lee, 1974; Brown, 1999; Bernheim
et al., 2001).
For some financial assets (i.e. cash, stock, individual retirement accounts and real estate)
and the age groups, the interaction terms of financial vulnerability index and age group
dummies are highly correlated with the interaction terms of financial assets and the same age
group dummies. To solve the multi-collinearity problem, I include the financial vulnerability
index rather than financial vulnerability index and age group dummy interaction terms in
equation (5.12). It dramatically reduces the multi-collinearity problem. The coefficients of
financial vulnerability index in Table 5.5 are positive and significant at around 6 percent for
term life insurance and total life insurance respectively but not for net amount at risk. It
is not surprising that the coefficients of financial vulnerability index is less significant and
have smaller magnitude than those shown in Table 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. The household will be
less vulnerable to the death of breadwinner if it has more financial assets. Therefore, it will
buy less life insurance.
The education levels of the respondent in the three tobit models in Table 5.5 are all
positive and statistically significant, consistent with Burnett and Palmer (1984). It suggests
that a more educated household has a greater likelihood of understanding the need for
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insurance. The results also provide some evidence that life insurance demand is related to
the bequest motive for the term life insurance regression and the sum of term life and net
amount at risk regression. If a couple desires to leave an estate, the evidence suggests a
positive relationship between a bequest and the demand for total life insurance although its
coefficient is not statistically significant.
I also note the negative relationship between term and whole life insurance in the demand
equation. Term life insurance is negatively related to cash value and net amount at risk
respectively of whole life insurance which means that whole life insurance is a substitute for
term life insurance. Another finding is that labor income of both spouses in most cases is
positively related to the net amount at risk, the term life and the total insurance demand
in my tobit models. Foreseeable major financial obligations expected to be met in the near
future such as educational expenses, health care costs and so forth are also positively and
significantly related to the net amount at risk, the term life and the total life insurance
demand. In this sense, people tend to use life insurance to manage their current or short-
term obligation.11
11I also explore the impact of the baby boom cohort on the life insurance demand. The Baby Boom
generation refers to the cohort born between 1946 and 1964. Contrary to the finding of Chen et al. (2001), I
do not find a significant difference of the baby boom cohort’s life insurance purchasing behavior from earlier
or later counterparts. Since controlling for whether a householder belongs to the baby boom cohort does not
improve my regression results, I do not include it in my regression model.
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5.5 Robustness Check: Valuing Non-monetary Contri-
bution
One may argue that the non-monetary contribution of a spouse who stays at home should
be considered as income as a family will also suffer a financial loss if the spouse were to die.
To impute the value of household services I divide the sample into two parts. It is interesting
to examine whether the positive and significant relationship between financial vulnerability
index and insurance holdings I find in Section 5.4 is driven by families’ different choices
between earning two incomes and earning one income.
Valuing in monetary terms the time spent on productive household activities by using
shadow and/or market prices and then adding this value to money income measure allow me
to examine whether the households take into account housework value when they purchase
life insurance. I impute housework value by using selectivity correction method of Heckman
(1979). Heckman (1979)’s two-step estimation procedure including both a selection equation
and regression equation:
Selection equation: (5.13)
z∗s = γ
′
sws + us, zs = 1 if z
∗
s > 0
zs = 0 otherwise
Prob(zs = 1) = Φ(γ
′
sws) and Prob(zs = 0) = 1− Φ(γ′sws)
where s = wife or hus.
Regression equation: (5.14)
Log(Ys) = β
′
sXs + εs observed only if zs = 1
(us, εs) ∼ bivariate normal [0, 0, 1, σs,ε, ρs].
The selection variable z∗s is not observed. I only observe only whether a spouse is working
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or not. If the spouse is working, labor income Ys is observed and I assign a working indicator
zs = 1. I first estimate the probit selection equation to obtain estimates of γs. Then I
calculate λˆs = φ(γˆ
′
sws)/Φ(γˆ
′
sws) for each observation in the selected sample. Next I estimate
βs and βs,λ = ρsσs,ε by least squares regression of Log of Ys on Xs and λˆs.
Log of labor income is the dependent variable in the regression equation which is deter-
mined by the number of children, education and age. The results of the Heckman two-step
estimation are shown in Table 5.6. As the number of children increases, the probability of the
respondent12 working outside increases while that of the spouse decreases. Higher education
is associated with the higher probability of working outside and the higher salary for both
respondents and spouses.
12In most cases the respondent is the husband.
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Table 5.6: Estimation Results of the Heckman Model
Regression Equation Log(Labor Income)
Independent Variables Respondent Spouse
Intercept 8.1039*** 9.2257***
(0.274) (0.396)
Number of Dependent Children 0.0527 -0.0034
(0.034) (0.049)
Education level of the respondent 0.1245***
(0.016)
Age of the respondent 0.0282***
(0.004)
Education level of the spouse 0.0527**
(0.023)
Age of the spouse 0.0118**
(0.006)
Adjusted R-square 0.1279 0.1183
Selection Equation Working Indicator
Independent Variables Respondent Spouse
Intercept 6.2064 5.6874
(43.358) (31.847)
Number of Dependent Children 0.0356* -0.1243***
(0.020) (0.014)
Education level of the respondent 0.0427***
(0.009)
Age of the respondent -0.0224***
(0.002)
Spouse working indicator -4.8848
(43.358)
Education level of the spouse 0.0629***
(0.006)
Age of the spouse -0.0207***
(0.002)
Respondent working indicator -5.1709
(31.846)
λ -7.5471*** -6.8699***
(0.274) (0.282)
Log-likelihood -1990.90 -3777.74
Number of observations: 6,755;
Standard errors are presented below the estimated coefficients;
*** Significant at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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If the observed labor income is less than the imputed value Yˆs, I set the labor income
equal to the imputed value Yˆs and then re-estimate the tobit regressions on life insurance
demand shown in equations (5.10), (5.11) and (5.12). Table 5.7 shows the results of life cycle
relationship between the sum of net amount at risk and term life insurance and financial
vulnerability index with imputed housework value. The regression results with the net
amount at risk or the term life insurance as the dependent variable adjusting for imputed
housework value have the same sign and significance as those in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3
but not reported here. Based on equation (5.12), Table 5.8 shows the life cycle relationship
between life insurance and household’s portfolio with imputed housework value in 2001.
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In general, my results are robust with and without imputation of housework value since
I obtain similar estimates and significance. In addition, I notice an interesting pattern.
Compared with Table 5.4 and Table 5.5, my regression results in Table 5.7 and 5.8 show
that life insurance demand is consistently slightly less sensitive to financial vulnerability in
both magnitude and statistical significance when I impute the housework value in monetary
terms.13 For example, the coefficient of financial vulnerability index in 2001 in Table 5.4 is
4.5764 while it decreases by 18 percent to 3.7363 in Table 5.7 with imputed housework value.
Similarly, in the portfolio implication regression, the coefficient of financial vulnerability
index in 2001 in Table 5.5 is 1.5686 while it decreases to 1.5159 in Table 5.8 with imputed
housework value. Moreover, the coefficient of financial vulnerability index in Table 5.8 is
slightly less significant at 8 percent compared to 6 percent in Table 5.5. It is not a surprising
result.
There are two possible explanations: first, the households do not buy life insurance on
the housekeepers. The traditional economic justification for life insurance is to protect a
person’s income on which others are dependent (?). If the households follow this suggestion,
no life insurance will be purchased on the housekeepers’ lives because other family members
do not depend on their earning capacity to sustain current living standards.
Second, if the one-income households (or so-called traditional families) recognize the eco-
nomic value of housework and impute the monetary terms to it, they will treat themselves as
two-income families because the housekeepers also create “income” at home. In theory, two-
income households are less vulnerable to the death of an earner than one-income households
in which only one parent is in the labor force. So the life insurance demand of two-income
families is less sensitive to the households’ financial vulnerabilities. Although the above two
explanations are alternative, they are not mutually exclusive explanations for my findings. It
is possible that the households realize the housework value but do not purchase life insurance
on the housekeepers. The first explanation seems to support the reduced significance in the
13I reach the same conclusion with the net amount at risk or the term life insurance as the dependent
variable in different years.
CHAPTER 5. HOUSEHOLD LIFE CYCLE PROTECTION 129
coefficients of financial vulnerability index and the second explanation provides a support
for their reduced magnitude.
5.6 Conclusions and Discussion
I find a relationship between a household’s financial vulnerability and the demand for life
insurance. Unlike Bernheim et al. (2001), I decompose the demand for life insurance into
the demand for term life and whole life insurance and take into account the vulnerability to
loss of labor income to both spouses. Further, I employ an index of financial vulnerability
that has several important features. First, it is transparent in the sense that I do not rely
upon a proprietary model to construct it. Second, it is easy to implement since it dramat-
ically reduces the cost associated with compiling data and modeling households’ financial
vulnerabilities. Third, my index can study households’ life-cycle protection by using different
types of life insurance respectively. Fourth, it is close to the reality in the sense that the
consumption to income ratio for each household in the index is obtained from the annual
survey, Consumer Expenditures.
Bernheim et al. (2001) found that the correlation between life insurance demand and
financial vulnerability is essentially zero throughout the entire life cycle (they did not dis-
tinguish between whole life insurance and term life insurance and they based the ESPlanner
to decide the benchmark life insurance). While my result also does not consistently apply
to whole life insurance, I do see a strong relationship between term and total insurance and
financial vulnerability in my life cycle analysis. My finding of a positive relationship between
a household’s financial vulnerability and the term life insurance and total life insurance hold-
ings respectively seems reasonable in the light of the theory. My empirical analysis shows
that the more volatile the living standard a household will be, the more term or total life
insurance it will purchase.
Another conclusion from my life cycle regression results is that older households tend
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to use less life insurance to protect a certain level of financial vulnerability than younger
households. This may arise from the elder’s avoidance of the higher price of life insurance
or decreasing absolute risk aversion since a household generally accumulate more wealth as
it gets older. I also present evidence of how individual households change their portfolio
over the life cycle and how this relates to the demand for life insurance. I find limited
positive (negative) relationship between individual retirement accounts, annuities and real
estate (bonds) respectively with life insurance holdings for some age groups. Finally, I take
into account the non-monetary contribution of family members. My results are robust no
matter whether I impute the value of the housework or not.
A
Summary of Data
I collected data from the Society of Actuaries’ Transactions Reports for each of the years
for which there were data. I used reports for calendar years published for the years 1951,
1961, 1971, and each year from 1981 to 1992. The last report is based on 1992 experience.
I understand that the Society of Actuaries is reviving its experience studies.
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Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 335.70 11.00 1174.25 10.00 1509.95 21.00
60-64 12102.34 308.00 3847.76 57.00 15950.10 365.00
65-69 39871.68 1413.00 4602.89 91.00 44474.57 1504.00
70-74 17218.98 958.00 1737.57 63.00 18956.55 1021.00
75-79 5873.40 484.00 666.00 37.00 6539.40 521.00
80-84 1774.33 226.00 209.00 26.00 1983.33 252.00
85-89 374.08 68.00 51.25 8.00 425.33 76.00
90-94 47.42 15.00 7.00 2.00 54.42 17.00
Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 1,371.88 36.00 2,454.63 18.00 3,826.51 54.00
60-64 23,718.46 605.00 9,902.34 116.00 33,620.80 721.00
65-69 96,620.43 3,371.00 19,390.30 333.00 116,010.73 3,704.00
70-74 60,560.45 3,371.00 10,594.01 349.00 71,154.46 3,720.00
75-79 26,772.96 2,275.00 3,901.58 195.00 30,674.54 2,470.00
80-84 7,701.84 1,002.00 1,057.17 109.00 8,759.01 1,111.00
85-89 1,717.08 310.00 275.00 35.00 1,992.08 345.00
90-94 254.42 59.00 39.00 7.00 293.42 66.00
Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 3,611.23 85.00 3,574.90 26.00 7,186.13 111.00
60-64 33,806.66 791.00 18,521.74 177.00 52,328.40 968.00
65-69 120,227.85 4,022.00 41,802.04 595.00 162,029.89 4,617.00
70-74 93,795.47 4,955.00 28,542.94 746.00 122,338.41 5,701.00
75-79 63,066.93 5,269.00 16,284.46 747.00 79,351.39 6,016.00
80-84 28,166.41 3,113.00 6,815.79 510.00 34,982.20 3,623.00
85-89 8,022.23 1,315.00 1,699.37 213.00 9,721.60 1,528.00
90-94 1,328.05 338.00 251.95 51.00 1,580.00 389.00
Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 26,599.21 440.00 11,124.59 99.00 37,723.80 539.00
60-64 82,756.29 1,568.00 32,978.18 347.00 115,734.47 1,915.00
65-69 185,232.93 4,924.00 73,727.06 1,003.00 258,959.99 5,927.00
70-74 157,276.45 6,571.00 68,210.94 1,397.00 225,487.39 7,968.00
75-79 97,763.34 6,189.00 42,614.73 1,347.00 140,378.07 7,536.00
80-84 48,755.90 4,727.00 20,588.86 1,093.00 69,344.76 5,820.00
85-89 19,601.58 2,719.00 7,936.75 681.00 27,538.33 3,400.00
90-94 4,980.49 990.00 2,087.62 294.00 7,068.11 1,284.00
Male Female Total
Attanined Age
Male Female Total
1961
1971
1981
Male Female Total
Attanined Age
Attanined Age
Attanined Age
1951
Male Female Total
Group annuity experience 1951, 1961, 1971 and 1981
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1982
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 28,631.53 453.00 11,754.62 92.00 40,386.15 545.00
60-64 89,455.43 1,753 .00 35,433.49 336.00 124,888.92 2,089 .00
65-69 192,308.39 5,097 .00 75,640.56 985.00 267,948.95 6,082 .00
70-74 162,420.78 6,740 .00 72,661.69 1,354 .00 235,082.47 8,094 .00
75-79 103,419.33 6,465 .00 48,058.37 1,540 .00 151,477.70 8,005 .00
80-84 52,549.11 4,861 .00 23,671.10 1,231 .00 76,220.21 6,092 .00
85-89 21,392.48 2,989 .00 9,443 .51 832.00 30,835.99 3,821 .00
90-94 5,716 .77 1,082 .00 2,526 .42 322.00 8,243 .19 1,404 .00
1983
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 33,163.65 510.00 13,783.18 117.00 46,946.83 627.00
60-64 98,632.53 1,868 .00 41,665.68 435.00 140,298.21 2,303 .00
65-69 195,074.64 5,153 .00 79,663.64 1,103 .00 274,738.28 6,256 .00
70-74 170,348.65 6,995 .00 72,621.93 1,511 .00 242,970.58 8,506 .00
75-79 107,213.60 6,964 .00 48,482.16 1,613 .00 155,695.76 8,577 .00
80-84 57,936.04 5,399 .00 24,237.52 1,388 .00 82,173.56 6,787 .00
85-89 22,035.27 3,111 .00 9,528 .77 895.00 31,564.04 4,006 .00
90-94 6,136 .86 1,218 .00 2,725 .40 373.00 8,862 .26 1,591 .00
1984
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 40,574.69 580.00 16,305.25 132.00 56,879.94 712.00
60-64 119,381.14 2,212 .00 48,941.94 448.00 168,323.08 2,660 .00
65-69 221,883.84 5,695 .00 91,062.97 1,241 .00 312,946.81 6,936 .00
70-74 200,590.93 8,196 .00 86,304.56 1,870 .00 286,895.49 10,066.00
75-79 129,357.81 8,141 .00 60,361.35 2,106 .00 189,719.16 10,247.00
80-84 67,297.97 6,288 .00 31,781.28 1,771 .00 99,079.25 8,059 .00
85-89 26,575.80 3,766 .00 12,400.26 1,211 .00 38,976.06 4,977 .00
90-94 7,743 .72 1,574 .00 3,681 .76 573.00 11,425.48 2,147 .00
1985
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 43,299.71 656.00 17,016.15 146.00 60,315.86 802.00
60-64 123,040.09 2,386 .00 50,603.92 565.00 173,644.01 2,951 .00
65-69 223,999.93 6,226 .00 93,571.37 1,368 .00 317,571.30 7,594 .00
70-74 207,718.42 9,000 .00 90,306.94 2,050 .00 298,025.36 11,050.00
75-79 137,102.94 9,186 .00 65,194.85 2,426 .00 202,297.79 11,612.00
80-84 71,953.72 7,141 .00 35,412.31 2,137 .00 107,366.03 9,278 .00
85-89 28,655.87 4,287 .00 14,095.45 1,437 .00 42,751.32 5,724 .00
90-94 8,411 .94 1,812 .00 4,179 .97 671.00 12,591.91 2,483 .00
Group annuity experience 1982 – 1985
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1986
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 44,010.72 627.00 16,677.86 112.00 60,688.58 739.00
60-64 122,620.42 2,163 .00 50,381.10 476.00 173,001.52 2,639 .00
65-69 227,995.35 5,699 .41 95,512.26 1,261 .00 323,507.61 6,960 .41
70-74 216,055.50 8,098 .29 93,727.78 1,966 .00 309,783.28 10,064.29
75-79 146,182.97 8,610 .00 68,834.32 2,324 .00 215,017.29 10,934.00
80-84 78,070.67 7,153 .00 38,836.55 2,108 .00 116,907.22 9,261 .00
85-89 31,484.42 4,005 .00 15,650.49 1,406 .00 47,134.91 5,411 .00
90-94 9,097 .10 1,678 .00 4,672 .65 690.00 13,769.75 2,368 .00
1987
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 47,303.94 598.00 17,781.62 134.00 65,085.56 732.00
60-64 129,028.29 2,138 .00 53,226.99 533.00 182,255.28 2,671 .00
65-69 238,848.85 5,773 .00 101,240.19 1,356 .00 340,089.04 7,129 .00
70-74 223,665.17 8,714 .00 98,442.35 2,054 .00 322,107.52 10,768.00
75-79 157,461.29 9,443 .00 74,752.64 2,525 .00 232,213.93 11,968.00
80-84 83,820.45 7,671 .00 43,600.05 2,452 .00 127,420.50 10,123.00
85-89 34,094.97 4,590 .00 18,036.28 1,677 .00 52,131.25 6,267 .00
90-94 9,836 .78 1,921 .00 5,395 .54 825.00 15,232.32 2,746 .00
1988
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 49,424.32 683.00 18,162.87 141.00 67,587.19 824.00
60-64 132,778.58 2,252 .00 53,788.54 513.00 186,567.12 2,765 .00
65-69 235,874.82 5,587 .00 102,022.53 1,295 .00 337,897.35 6,882 .00
70-74 221,164.05 8,388 .00 99,853.21 2,116 .00 321,017.26 10,504.00
75-79 162,202.31 9,530 .00 78,542.78 2,630 .00 240,745.09 12,160.00
80-84 88,225.65 8,012 .00 47,418.51 2,583 .00 135,644.16 10,595.00
85-89 35,929.54 4,707 .00 20,142.57 1,879 .00 56,072.11 6,586 .00
90-94 10,484.98 2,002 .00 5,926 .74 845.00 16,411.72 2,847 .00
1989
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 45,167.60 580.00 19,788.90 138.00 64,956.50 718.00
60-64 120,348.84 2,008 .00 53,312.98 488.00 173,661.82 2,496 .00
65-69 201,223.57 4,827 .00 94,345.49 1,235 .00 295,569.06 6,062 .00
70-74 180,723.00 6,748 .00 88,016.87 1,829 .00 268,739.87 8,577 .00
75-79 134,297.88 7,852 .00 70,107.48 2,357 .00 204,405.36 10,209.00
80-84 72,524.22 6,606 .00 41,921.07 2,353 .00 114,445.29 8,959 .00
85-89 29,672.14 3,992 .00 18,031.93 1,628 .00 47,704.07 5,620 .00
90-94 8,245 .34 1,704 .00 5,114 .09 820.00 13,359.43 2,524 .00
Group annuity experience 1986 – 1989
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1990
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 53,375.95 686.00 24,851.00 174.00 78,226.95 860.00
60-64 146,190.29 2,333 .00 67,235.53 596.00 213,425.82 2,929 .00
65-69 258,735.98 5,949 .00 122,669.86 1,562 .00 381,405.84 7,511 .00
70-74 238,694.07 8,911 .00 116,031.28 2,327 .00 354,725.35 11,238.00
75-79 189,088.76 11,105.00 95,064.28 3,186 .00 284,153.04 14,291.00
80-84 109,583.14 9,912 .00 62,967.19 3,520 .00 172,550.33 13,432.00
85-89 48,022.47 6,572 .00 30,700.37 2,778 .00 78,722.84 9,350 .00
90-94 14,672.14 2,842 .00 10,005.89 1,445 .00 24,678.03 4,287 .00
1991
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 50,731.54 661.00 22,245.01 158.00 72,976.55 819.00
60-64 137,582.08 2,383 .00 60,722.23 543.00 198,304.31 2,926 .00
65-69 240,820.91 5,774 .00 114,994.74 1,557 .00 355,815.65 7,331 .00
70-74 230,909.08 8,685 .00 115,825.34 2,433 .00 346,734.42 11,118.00
75-79 188,317.23 10,961.00 96,727.27 3,360 .00 285,044.50 14,321.00
80-84 112,587.59 10,048.00 66,245.62 3,791 .00 178,833.21 13,839.00
85-89 48,883.89 6,713 .00 33,022.70 2,996 .00 81,906.59 9,709 .00
90-94 15,033.98 2,901 .00 10,909.55 1,624 .00 25,943.53 4,525 .00
1992
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 47,790.52 689.00 20,925.44 156.00 68,715.96 845.00
60-64 122,033.83 2,143 .00 55,616.52 466.00 177,650.35 2,609 .00
65-69 216,153.60 5,124 .00 107,068.38 1,429 .00 323,221.98 6,553 .00
70-74 212,415.17 7,526 .00 111,099.67 2,260 .00 323,514.84 9,786 .00
75-79 173,061.53 9,440 .00 91,863.84 3,044 .00 264,925.37 12,484.00
80-84 106,152.91 9,177 .00 63,719.81 3,349 .00 169,872.72 12,526.00
85-89 47,214.93 6,190 .00 33,278.32 2,984 .00 80,493.25 9,174 .00
90-94 15,059.41 2,859 .00 11,268.86 1,634 .00 26,328.27 4,493 .00
Group annuity experience 1990 – 1992
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